

# File #:

62-116395

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# Serial Scope:

301 THRU 308

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311 THRU 316

318 THRU 329

331, 332

334 THRU 336

337 THRU 339



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ When Separated  
From Accompanying Documents)

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Senate Select Committee Request  
for Documents on the Cabinet  
Committee to Combat Terrorism

The Department of State has been asked by the Senate Select Committee investigating intelligence to provide information on the structure and functions of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism and its Working Group. Because all of the basic documents concerning the CCT are Presidential, we are forwarding them to you for review for possible release to the Senate Committee.

The relevant documents are:

- Memorandum for the President from Secretary William P. Rogers on September 18, 1972 (the report referred to in the President's Memorandum of September 25, 1972);
- Memorandum for the Secretary from President Richard M. Nixon on September 25, 1972; and
- Six reports to the President from the Chairman of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (the Secretary of State).

These documents set forth the basic structure and functions of the Cabinet Committee and its Working Group.

There are many functions of the Cabinet Committee and its Working Group discussed in the reports to the President other than the intelligence function being investigated by the Senate Select Committee. We do not see any need for the discussion of these other functions to be withheld from the SSC.

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From Accompanying Documents)

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JUL 14 1975

JFH

51 JUL 23 1975

6 JUN 25 1975

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From Accompanying Documents)

-2-

For your convenience we have noted below the sections of the reports to the President that relate to the intelligence aspect of the Cabinet Committee and its Working Group:

- September 18, 1972 memo - page 2: #2, 3; page 4: #11.
- November 2, 1972 memo - page 1; page 2; paragraph 3.
- January 8, 1973 memo - page 1: #3; page 2: #6, 7, 9.
- March 8, 1973 memo - page 1: #6..
- March 29, 1973 memo - page 1: paragraph 2; page 2: paragraph 1; page 3: paragraph 1.
- June 27, 1973 memo - page 1: #2, 3; page 2: paragraph 6.
- February 18, 1975 memo - Page 3: paragraph 3, 5; page 6: paragraph 5, 6; Tab 2 (Guidelines) page 4: paragraph 3; Tab 3 (Procedures) Enclosure #1 page 5: paragraph 4.

In addition to the above documents, we would also plan to provide the Senate Committee with the following narrative statement on the CCT and intelligence:

Begin Statement (CONFIDENTIAL):

With the exception of a weekly publication by the CIA on international terrorism, requested by the Cabinet Committee on January 1, 1973, the intelligence functions of the Cabinet Committee and its Working Group are handled through established interagency channels. The agencies most active in generation and coordination of terrorism information for the Working Group are the CIA, the FBI, NSA, DOD, the Secret Service, the Department of Treasury and the State Department.

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From Accompanying Documents)

- 3. -

These Working Group agencies set their own priorities and parameters concerning intelligence on terrorism matters. From time to time the CIA requests comments from the Working Group on its weekly terrorism reports.

The organization of the Cabinet Committee is delineated in the President's memorandum of September 25, 1972. The Working Group is composed of senior representatives of the ten agencies on the Cabinet Committee and representatives of the following agencies: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Energy Research and Development Administration, Federal Protective Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Metropolitan Police Department, National Security Agency, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Management and Budget, and the United States Information Agency. These additional agencies were invited to participate in the Working Group by the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism (S/CCT), in his capacity as Chairman of the Working Group.

Under the Working Group there is one formal subgroup, the Behavioral Science Resource Group (BSRG), which is composed of behavioral science experts from the State Department, the CIA, the FBI and USIA. The State Department member chairs BSRG. The Resource Group

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- 4 -

has a mandate to seek to improve the United States' response to acts of international terrorism through use of behavioral science techniques.

End Statement

George S. Springsteen  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Memorandum of September 18, 1972
2. Memorandum of September 25, 1972
3. Six Reports to the President

Drafted: S/CCT: JTBrowne: nwh  
6/11/75 Ext 20831

Clearance: M - Mr. Eagleburger  
INR - Mr. Kirk  
S/CCT - Mr. Fearey *mf*

~~SECRET~~

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ When Separated  
From Accompanying Documents)

- 1 - Mr. Wannall - enc.
- 1 - Mr. Cregar - enc.
- 1 - Mr. Mintz - enc.
- 1 - Mr. Hotis - enc.
- June 30, 1975
- 1 - Mr. Daly - enc.

The Deputy Attorney General

Director, FBI

REC-107

62-116395-338

**SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**

Reference is made to memorandum of K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, to Mr. John Mintz, Legal Counsel Division of this Bureau, dated June 26, 1975, captioned "DAG Inquiry Re Communication by Former AAG Doar to FBI Regarding Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party Delegation."

Regarding your request contained in referenced communication for the Bureau to locate and furnish certain documents, it is my understanding that you are in possession of the documents requested.

In response to your request that we furnish our observations concerning the making of the documents available to former Assistant Attorney General John Doar, may I suggest that this raises an issue which has been discussed in the past by the Bureau and the Department and other Government agencies. This issue to my knowledge has not been resolved. That issue is whether a former employee should be allowed access to documents in the Government's possession to refresh his recollection for possible testimony before the Senate Select Committee. It is this Bureau's position that such documents should not be made available for the aforementioned purpose, and in those instances where a former employee cannot respond accurately to the question of the Senate Select Committee or any other Congressional investigative body, the Committee or Congressional body can be referred to the appropriate bureau or agency which will, if appropriate, furnish the necessary information. I am sure you will understand our concern in this regard as far as setting a precedent which might serve for future requests of this nature.

1 - Mr. K. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

PVD:ech

SEE NOTE ON PAGE 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-16-2000 BY SP-6/MLP/SP-6/MLP

MAILED 6  
JUL 1 1975  
FBI

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

The Deputy Attorney General

NOTE: According to referenced communication, Mr. Doar requested to review a communication he caused to be sent while in the Department asking for information concerning the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party Delegation. The Deputy Attorney General had asked that the documentation concerning the request and our response be located and furnished to him. The Department also asked our views as to whether he should be given access to or delivered the documents for the purpose of refreshing Doar's recollection.



OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUN 26 1975

TO: John Mintz  
Legal Counsel Division  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: K. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for Intelligence  
Coordination

SUBJECT: DAG Inquiry Re Communication by Former AAG Doar  
to FBI Regarding Mississippi Freedom Democratic  
Party Delegation

*Sensitivity - 75*

(1) The DAG has asked me to request that the Bureau make a file check to determine what, if any, documents may be found in FBI files relating to a request made by Mr. Doar in August 1964 for information and Bureau action regarding members of the subject delegation. It is our understanding that Mr. Doar requested certain information from the FBI regarding this delegation in mid-August 1964; and that some information was delivered to the DOJ (either to Mr. Doar or then DAG Katzenbach) shortly thereafter, in the latter part of August 1964.

(2) It is possible that Mr. Doar may be asked about these matters in connection with the Senate Select Committee inquiry (reference Appendix D, Item 7, 5/14/75 SSC request). The DAG has also asked that, after such documentation as may be developed under (1) above has been located, the Bureau furnish to him its view as to the access/delivery to Mr. Doar of such documentation for the purpose of refreshing his recollection.

(3) An expeditious response to this request will be appreciated.

REC-107

62-116395-338

14 JUL 10 1975

FBI  
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DATE 10-16-2000 BY SP8MUN/pjg  
MDR-16



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *Wannall*

FROM : W. *Wannall* Cregar

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)

DATE: 6/11/75

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

Assoc. Dir. ☒  
Dep. AD Adm. ☒  
Dep. AD Inv. ☒  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. ☐  
Comp. Syst. ☐  
Ext. Affairs ☐  
Files & Com. ☐  
Gen. Inv. ☐  
Ident. ☐  
Inspection ☒  
Intell. ☒  
Laboratory ☐  
Legal Coun. ☒  
Plan. & Eval. ☐  
Spec. Inv. ☐  
Training ☐  
Telephone Rm. ☐  
Director Sec'y ☐

By letter dated 5/14/75, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Appendix C, Item number 10, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to the elimination of the Liaison Section of the FBI in 1970 and its reestablishment in late 1972.

Among the enclosures to our letter to the Attorney General (AG), dated 6/13/75, being proposed for forwarding to the Committee is E. S. Miller memorandum to Mr. Felt, 7/14/72. On page 2 there is information that "our close association with the Chief Postal Inspector and his top officials has resulted in that agency providing support in some of our most delicate intelligence operations looking to the identification of illegal hostile intelligence activities in this country." This could possibly be construed to include opening of mail. It is to be noted that opening of mail by FBI is the subject of a separate SSC request and future correspondence with the SSC, through the AG, will address itself to this subject. Former Chief Postal Inspector Henry B. Montague, with whom we have had extensive dealings in the past, is scheduled to appear before the full SSC on 6/12/75 and it is expected that he will be questioned about possible FBI participation in mail openings.

RLM:mam

RLM (7) mam

REC-107 62-716395-337  
3 JUL 11 1975

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4UM/AP

10-16-2000

MDR-116

CONTINUED - OVER

Classified by 6283  
Exempt from GDS, Category 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Also included in this response is Daniel M. Armstrong III memorandum to L. Patrick Gray III, dated 9/8/72, classified Confidential. This memorandum states that the responsibilities of Legats have increased in recent years to include the collection of political intelligence information for dissemination to Dr. Kissinger and others. This is the HILEV Program. The SSC has requested committee staff access to all indices and control files pertaining to all programs operated by the Intelligence Division from 1960 to present and it is expected that HILEV will be included in the response to this request.

ACTION:

None. For information.

KS

Jma

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten initials]*

WRL

*[Handwritten signature]*

K

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	_____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
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Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

NR 009 SF CODE

9:10 PM NITEL 6/11/75 CJC

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM: SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL AND INTD.

SENSTUDY 75.

REBUTEL JUNE 9, 1975.

ON JUNE 11, 1975, FORMER SA DAVID E. TODD ADVISED OF THE  
WAIVER OF EMPLOYEE SECRECY AGREEMENTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF A  
STAFF INTERVIEW BY SSC WITH HIM. TODD REQUESTED AGENT BE AVAIL-  
ABLE DURING INTERVIEW TO ASSIST HIM. TODD INDICATED HE WOULD  
IMMEDIATELY ADVISE THIS OFFICE IF IN RECEIPT OF INFORMATION RE  
DATE OF INTERVIEW.

SAC, SAN FRANCISCO, WILL CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION FOR  
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING HIS INTERVIEW.

END

HOLD PLS

EX-117

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DATE 10-17-2000 BY SP8AM/PP  
MDR-16

REC-26

62-116395-336

14 JUL 2 1975

56 JUL 17 1975

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: June 2, 1975

FROM : Legal Counsel *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

On 5-30-75, John Elliff, Task Force Director of captioned Committee's Task Force on Domestic Intelligence Activities, and SA Paul V. Daly of this Division discussed the possibility of Elliff and members of his task force, conducting the inquiry into the FBI, having lunch with the Director. Elliff stated he felt that such an arrangement would be very beneficial and indicated that he and four or five staff members would attend such a luncheon.

It would appear that such an arrangement might be beneficial and consideration should be given to arranging a luncheon if the Director's schedule permits.

## RECOMMENDATION:

That the luncheon be arranged in line with the above at a time convenient to the Director.

- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. Hotis
- 1 - Mr. Daly
- 1 - Mrs. Metcalf

PVD:EEK *[Signature]*  
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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MDR-16

EX-117  
REC-24

62-116395-335

7 JUN 25 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

51 JUL 15 1975

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-19-75

FROM : Legal Counsel *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Reference is made to my memo dated 6-2-75, that a luncheon with staff members of the Senate Select Committee Task Force conducting the inquiry into the FBI be held with the Director.

Mr. Kelley approved the recommendation, and Mr. Elliff, Domestic Task Head for the Committee, was asked whether he would like to attend a luncheon with Mr. Kelley and he indicated he would, but would have to check with the Committee. Mr. Elliff was advised that the Director's schedule permitted a luncheon be held on June 24, 1975, at 12:30 p.m..

Mr. Elliff stated on 6-18-75, he will attend the luncheon along with the following staff members of the Committee: Lester B. Seidel, John Smith, William Ricks, Michael Epstein, and Mark Gitenstein.

In addition to the staff members, Section Chief William O. Cregar, Inspector John B. Hotis, and SA Paul V. Daly will attend. Assistant Director John A. Mintz will also attend luncheon.

## RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

- 1 - Mrs. Metcalf
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Hotis
- 1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:EEK  
(8)

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DATE 10-17-2000 BY SP2AUMB/PJ

MDR-16

REC-26

62-116395-334

3 JUN 25 1975

EX-117



14 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo to Mr. Adams from Legal Counsel  
Re: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REQUESTS

for denying GAO access to Bureau files. A response has been prepared and furnished the Department.

Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights of the Judiciary (Edwards Committee)

The Department has advised the Chief Counsel Alan Parker and Minority Counsel Ken Klee that excised appendices a through e of the Peterson Report on COINTELPRO are available for their review in Department space.

Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights (Abzug's Committee)

By letter dated June 10, and June 16, 1975, we have been requested to furnish complete information concerning practices and procedures, etc., concerning electronic surveillances. Information is being gathered so that appropriate responses may be provided.

Hearings

We are scheduled to testify 7-9-75, before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Judiciary on Terrorism. Testimony for this hearing has been prepared by the Intelligence Division.

We anticipate having to testify before the Post Office, Civil Service Subcommittee on Postal Fees, Mail and Label Management. The necessary materials for the testimony have been gathered and as soon as a request has been received, the testimony will be prepared in final form. The testimony will concern mail covers.

The following Committees have indicated Bureau testimony in the near future:

The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (Tunney's Committee); Topic: S. 1427 - S. 1428 (Criminal Justice legislation); Briefing book has been prepared concerning this legislation.

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MDR-16

Memo to Mr. Adams from Legal Counsel

Re: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REQUESTS

House Judiciary Committee on Civil and Constitutional Rights; Topic: H. R. 61 and H. R. 62 (House version of S. 1427 and S. 1428 (Criminal Justice Legislation)).

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities; Topic: Bureau legal authority to conduct domestic and counterintelligence activities. Tentative testimony is scheduled for late June or early July. We will be furnished additional details by the Committee as to the various topics to be covered during this testimony.

The Director along with Kevin Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, is scheduled to appear before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Judiciary Committee (Kastenmier) to testify concerning electronic surveillances, on 6-26-75.

Special Agents Bill D. Williams and Inspector's Aide Edward D. Hagerty have been requested to appear before the Committee on Government Operations, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Jackson's Committee) the topic of their testimony is to be their inquiry into Drug Enforcement Agency at the Departments request. The Department has advised they will make the agents available for testimony on the morning of 6-19-75.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

*PVD JBH K JH Jma chm Per Jm*

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DATE 10-16-2000 BY SP2Acm/fp

MDR-16

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75-036

2 July 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT: Update of Task Force Assignments

REFERENCE: Memos dated 10 and 11 June on subject of Task Force Assignments

1. Listed below are issues being addressed by Task Forces under the direction of Mr. Wilderotter, with additional personnel assignments as noted. This list supersedes the referenced memoranda.

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Principal Agency</u>	<u>Principal Officer</u>	<u>Task Force Assignments</u>
Assassinations	White House	Mr. Wilderotter IDS 145-7094	James Gardner State Dept. IDS 101-29034
Drug Abuse	CIA	Sayre Stevens IDS 143-4303	Malcolm Lawrence State Dept. IDS 101-28694
Political Abuses (1964)	FBI	Hunter Helgeson 324-4885 (Green 5303)	3 JUL 10 1975
Domestic Surveillance	Justice	John Martin IDS 187-4555	Charles Kane CIA IDS 143-6777
			Verne St. Mars State Dept. IDS 101-29448

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DATE 10-16-2000 BY SP2 RUM/MS  
MDA-16

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:  
§ 52(1) (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON  
Undetermined  
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

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<u>Subject</u>	<u>Principal Agency</u>	<u>Principal Officer</u>	<u>Task Force Assignments</u>
Domestic Surveillance (Contd)			J. G. Deegan FBI 324-4646
Electronic Surveillance and Warrantless Wiretap	Justice	George Calhoun IDS 187-4401	William Jones State Dept. IDS 101-20370  J. W. Dalseg FBI 324-4713
Use of National Organizations	FBI	John Thomas 324-4609	
Use of Proprietary Organizations	CIA	Erich Isenstead Green 3140	Lee Peters State Dept. IDS 101-29403  W. A. Branigan FBI 324-4550
Mail Cover and Intercept	Justice	Phil White IDS 187-4674	J. P. Lee FBI 324-4562  Ernest Tsikerdanos CIA IDS 143-6348
Watch List	DoD	Benson Buffham NSA 688-7222	R. L. Shackelford FBI 324-4594
Army Surveillance	DoD	Dr. David Cooke 695-4436	

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2. The following officers from the Department of State have been named to assist in the CIA preparation of comprehensive papers on the following geographic and subject areas:

Greece

James Gardner  
IDS 101-29034

Dominican Republic

James Gardner  
IDS 101-29034

Laos

James Henderson  
East Asia Bureau

The Congo

Bayard King  
IDS 101-21504

Indonesia

Patricia Barnett  
IDS 101-22369

Katzenbach Report

Emerson Brown  
IDS 101-21504

*Harriett Mowitt*

Harriett Mowitt  
Executive Secretary  
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

cc: Mr. Buchen  
Mr. Hills

Distribution:

- 1 - Mr. Wilderotter
- 1 - Mr. Latimer
- 1 - Mr. Hyland
- 1 - Mr. Morell
- 1 - Mr. O'Connor
- 1 - Mr. Cregar ✓
- 1 - Mr. Knoche
- 1 - Mr. Clarke

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)  
DATE: 7/2/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar *WOC*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
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Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-16-2000 BY *SP8/BJF*  
*MDR-16*

This morning (7/2/75) Michael Epstein, Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff Member, advised SA Paul V. Daly, Legal Counsel Division, that he, Epstein, is to interview SA John R. Borys and former Assistant Director Ivan Conrad at 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., respectively, Monday, 7/7/75. Borys is assigned to WFO and Conrad resides 1307 Capulet Court, McLean, Virginia 22101, unlisted telephone number 356-7590. Interviews are to concern the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.

These are the latest in a series of interviews regarding the King case being conducted by the SSC Staff of present and former SAs. It is believed that Borys and Conrad should be released from their secrecy agreements to enable them to be interviewed which is the same procedure which we have been taking with the others who have been interviewed. The release from the agreement which we are recommending will, of course, be conditional that the interview relate only to the King matter.

## RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Borys and Conrad be released from their secrecy agreement in order to be interviewed, but only relating to the King case. On approval, Legal Counsel Division will advise them of the release and invite them to consult with the Legal Counsel Division early a.m. 7/7/75 in preparation for the interviews.

62-116395

3 JUL 10 1975

1 - 67- (Personnel File Form of SA John R. Borys)  
1 - 67- (Personnel File Former Assistant Director Ivan Conrad)

SFP:1hb/hb

(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: Senstudy 75  
62-116395

2. Borys and Conrad, when contacted by the Legal Counsel Division, should be offered the services of a Bureau representative who, if they desire, will accompany them to the interview. This representative, although not actually present during the interview, will be available nearby for consultation purposes should the interview touch upon sensitive, privileged information, such as relating to identities of sources, sensitive techniques and methods, etc. INTD will designate the representative for this purpose.

*EWS*

ADDENDUM: SFP:mjg 7/2/75

Pursuant to request of SA Daly of Legal Counsel Division, SA Borys and former Assistant Director Conrad were telephonically alerted to the planned interviews of them. They were both told that they would be further contacted by the Legal Counsel Division. Conrad specifically requested that his unlisted telephone number not be furnished to the SSC.

*EWS*

*WRL*

*JM*

*[Signature]*

*JBA per*

*OK*

*S.F. Phillips accompanied  
Borys 7/7 & will accompany  
Conrad 7/9*

*8/9/75*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. Callahan

1 - Mr. Jenkins

DATE: 6/30/75

1 - Mr. Adams

1 - Each Assistant Director

1 - Mr. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

This memorandum records the receipt of the latest request from the Senate Select Committee (SSC).

On the evening of 6/27/75, Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department of Justice furnished to Mr. Paul Daly of the Legal Counsel Division the attached copy of a draft letter to the Attorney General (AG) from Senators Church and Tower along with notifications concerning certain matters currently under investigation by the SSC which relate to the FBI as well as to the Department of Justice.

The latest request which is identified as a draft is broken down into three sections identified as: I. Issues, II. Areas of General Inquiry, and III. Case Studies.

## I. Issues

The SSC's inquiry into the intelligence and counter-intelligence activities of the FBI is designed to examine fundamental issues which bear directly on the adequacy of current legislation and administrative organization and procedure. As a means of examining the issues in the context of actual FBI intelligence operations, the Committee intends to study certain specific topics, some of which are general in nature and others of which involve specific cases, programs or techniques. The specific issues are set out in the attachment under section I. A-F.

## II. Areas of General Inquiry

The following contains descriptions of the general areas of inquiry into which the Committee intends to engage:

Enclosures

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ENCLOSURE

4 JUL 17 1975

Memorandum for Mr. Adams  
RE: SENSTUDY 75

(A) Legal Authority for FBI Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities

(B) Organization and Operation of the FBI Intelligence Division (INTD)

(C) FBI Internal Security Intelligence Operations

(D) FBI and the U. S. Intelligence Community

(E) FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Operations

(F) Inspection Division Investigations

(G) FBI Intelligence Activities and State or Local Law Enforcement Agencies

### III. Case Studies

This section contains descriptions of specific cases in which the SSC is interested. The descriptions indicate whether the investigations may concentrate on specific allegations of possible abuses or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe in the words of the Committee improprieties may have occurred.

In this portion of the enclosed request the Committee lists 19 general questions. In addition, under each case study the letter requests additional information and documents.

The case studies in which the Committee is interested are identified as follows:

(A). Electronic Surveillance

1. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance
2. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance and Leaks
3. Surveillance of Martin Luther King, Jr.
4. Surveillance at the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, 1964

(B). Surreptitious Entry

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Adams  
RE: SENSTUDY 75

- (C). Mail Covers and Mail Openings
- (D). Other Specific Techniques
- (E). COINTELPRO and Disruptive Activities
- (F). Clandestine Informant Activities
- (G). Notional Organizations
- (H). Joint FBI - Police Operations
  - 1. The White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Mississippi
  - 2. The Black Panther Party, Chicago
- (I). The Huston Plan
- (J). Alleged Political Misuse of the FBI

The remaining portions of the enclosed letter are directed to the Department of Justice and are not being addressed in this memorandum.

In connection with another Senstudy matter, Section Chief William O. Cregar had a meeting with Mr. John Elliff who is Chief of the Task Force for the SSC on the morning of 6/30/75. Elliff apologized for the submission of the 6/25/75 draft letter, saying it was forced upon the Committee by the White House. According to Elliff, the SSC has been aware that much of the information requested from the Intelligence Community was being held up by the White House until such time as the SSC identified specific abuses it was interested in investigating. As a result, the attached draft was put together by the SSC to break the logjam. Elliff admitted that much of the information requested in the 6/25/75 draft letter was embodied in the request of 5/14/75. For this reason, Elliff advised he contacted Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, on the morning of 6/30/75 to request a meeting between himself, O'Connor, and Messrs Wannall, Mintz and Cregar. The purpose of the meeting would be to allow Elliff to clarify the draft letter of 6/25/75.

\*FBI

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. Adams  
RE: SENSTUDY 75

ACTION:

We feel that a meeting with Elliff would be beneficial and plan to meet with him as soon as possible to obtain clarification of this latest SSC request.

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*JRA  
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*JM*

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D R A F T

FRANK CUPCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN  
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## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 25, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi  
The Attorney General  
U. S. Department of Justice  
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Enclosed with this letter are notifications concerning certain matters currently under investigation by the Select Committee which relate to government entities under your jurisdiction.

These notifications are submitted pursuant to an agreement between the Committee, the various intelligence entities, and the White House. Pursuant to that agreement, the various entities in the Executive Branch have agreed not only to make available the pertinent witnesses, but also to submit in response all information and material which they possess that is relevant to the areas and cases which the Committee wishes to investigate. The response should include all relevant underlying documentation and other information, including documents which may not have come to the Committee's attention and which the Committee has not specifically requested, and all material relating to any prior Executive Branch inquiry into the matter. In addition, we would welcome a current analysis of the particular questions raised by the Committee and any other observations on the subject that you believe would be helpful.

We welcome the promise of cooperation and full disclosure that underlies that agreement. Success in fulfilling the full disclosure policy contained in the agreement is indispensable to the Committee's analysis and to the formulation of our ultimate findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Within the Committee mandate, contained in S. Res. 21, there are four broad subjects relating to the intelligence community which we are required to investigate and study in order to determine the facts and ultimately to decide whether to make recommendations for legislative or other changes. They are:

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1. The structure, performance, and utility of government operations with respect to intelligence activities;
2. Whether certain policies or practices are or are not illegal, unethical, or otherwise improper;
3. Whether there has or has not been excessive duplication or inadequate coordination between and among intelligence agencies and, more generally, the efficiency of intelligence activities; and
4. Whether there has or has not been adequate internal and external control and oversight over the policies and practices of intelligence agencies.

In attempting to find the answers to these fundamental questions, the Committee is proceeding in two ways. First, we are examining intelligence functions broadly as instruments of government policy, giving attention to the authority for particular functions, the problems which intelligence activities are designed to solve, the procedures by which intelligence activities are and have been proposed, approved, executed, evaluated, and terminated, the range and scope of the activities utilized to achieve intelligence objectives, and the propriety and utility of the activities undertaken. Second, we will examine in depth certain specific subjects within the broad topics of investigation. (We would, of course, welcome your suggestion of other cases that would give added insight into intelligence matters under your jurisdiction.) These specific subjects for investigation are not intended to limit the scope contained in the more general questions.

The annexed notifications spell these matters out in greater detail. In addition, they ask certain specific questions, set forth certain previously requested documents not yet received, request additional documents,\* and, in some cases, ask for the names and present addresses of persons who have held certain

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\* These specific requests are not, of course, intended to limit the agreement to come forward with all relevant information and material, including documents, whether or not they have been brought to the Committee's attention or have been specifically requested by the Committee.

positions. Where appropriate, the subject's description indicates, pursuant to the agreed Outline for Inquiry Procedures, the matter primarily concerns allegations of abuse or other controversial specific matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. Finally, the notifications indicate the name(s) of the staff members(s) who, in addition to the Committee's senior staff, will be responsible for the particular matters.

The Committee, in the course of the next few months, will undertake other subjects for investigation as its work proceeds and will notify you as appropriate.

We look forward to your cooperation in these matters.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church  
Chairman

John Tower  
Vice Chairman

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
(Including DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
(INCLUDING DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE)

I. Issues

The Committee's inquiry into the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is examining fundamental issues which bear directly on the adequacy of current legislation and administrative organization and procedure. The Committee seeks to determine whether FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities achieve legitimate objectives in conformity with the rule of law. Among the basic issues to be addressed are the following:

- A. What is the legal authority for FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities? Should the FBI's authority be clarified or revised or incorporated in a comprehensive statutory charter?
- B. What limitations are placed on FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities by the Constitution and laws of the United States? Should these limitations be clarified or revised?
- C. What have been the purposes and aims of FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities? Should these objectives be modified?
- D. How have the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the FBI been organized and coordinated with other agencies of government? Should these procedures and practices be revised?
- E. What have been the procedures for and techniques of intelligence gathering and dissemination and counterintelligence operations used by the FBI? Under what conditions and through what procedures should these methods and techniques be used in the future?
- F. What have been and should be the mechanisms for internal and external policy-making, control, and supervision of FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities?

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As a means of examining the above issues in the context of actual FBI intelligence operations, the Committee intends to study certain specific topics, some of which are general in nature, and others of which involve specific cases, programs or techniques. Part II, below, contains descriptions of the general areas into which the Committee intends to inquire. Part III contains descriptions of the specific cases mentioned above. The descriptions specifically indicate whether the investigation may concentrate on specific allegations of possible abuses or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. In addition to the topics described below, additional areas of inquiry may develop during the course of the Committee's work.

## II. Areas of General Inquiry

### A. Legal Authority for FBI Intelligence and Counter-intelligence Activities

The Committee is examining the legal basis for FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities. There may be serious question as to the adequacy of the present legislative framework for the FBI's functions in these fields. Current statutes authorize the FBI to perform investigative and law enforcement functions, but they do not specifically authorize intelligence or counterintelligence activities. Therefore, the Committee seeks to determine whether the FBI's authority should be clarified, revised, or incorporated in a comprehensive statutory charter.

Responsible staff: Senior staff  
Task Force leader  
Mark Gitenstein

### B. Organization and Operation of the FBI Intelligence Division

The Committee is investigating the structure and operating practices of the FBI Intelligence Division. Proposals have been made that the national security intelligence and counterintelligence functions of the FBI should be lodged in a separate agency or otherwise separated from the FBI's criminal investigative activities. Further recommendations have been advanced for improved coordination between the FBI and other intelligence agencies, for strengthened supervision of FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities by the Attorney General or an independent board, and for clearer standards and procedures for FBI activities in this area. Therefore, the Committee desires complete information on the operating practices and procedures of the FBI Intelligence Division and of the field office activities supervised by the Intelligence Division.

The Committee's inquiry focuses on the following specific areas:

1. FBI Internal Security Intelligence Operations

The Committee seeks to determine the nature and purpose of FBI intelligence operations directed at foreign intelligence activities and subversive or extremist activities within the United States. It has been alleged that the scope of FBI intelligence investigations is too broad and has extended to legitimate political activities. Consequently, the Committee must examine how the FBI's responsibilities have been defined.

Responsible staff: Senior staff  
Task Force leader  
Mark Gitenstein

2. The FBI and the U. S. Intelligence Community

The Committee seeks to determine what have been the policies and procedures for coordination between the FBI and other agencies in the U. S. intelligence community. There have been occasions in the past where friction between the FBI and other agencies has produced serious dissatisfaction within the U. S. intelligence community. The purpose of this inquiry is to evaluate the adequacy of past and present coordinating mechanisms.

Responsible staff: Senior staff  
Task Force leader  
Mark Gitenstein

3. FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Operations

The Committee seeks to determine the nature of FBI counterintelligence operations directed at foreign intelligence activities within the United States or at any other hostile foreign-related activities within the United States. Since FBI operations to "counter" these activities go beyond intelligence collection, the Committee must consider whether such practices require statutory authorization. The impact of counterintelligence operations on United States foreign relations will also be considered.

Responsible staff: Senior staff  
Task Force leader  
Loch Johnson  
Barbara Banoff

4. Inspection Division Investigations

The Committee is examining the relationship of the FBI Inspection Division to FBI intelligence and counterintelligence activities. This includes both regular Inspection Division reviews of Intelligence Division and field office functions and specific investigations of allegations of improper conduct in connection with FBI intelligence activities.

Responsible staff: Senior staff  
Task Force leader  
Mark Gitenstein

5. FBI Intelligence Activities and State or Local Law Enforcement Agencies

The Committee seeks to determine the nature of the relationships between FBI intelligence activities and state and local law enforcement agencies. This subject involves the delicate balance between the necessary centralization of certain law enforcement activities and the Constitutionally-mandated decentralization of general law enforcement responsibility. It is necessary for the Committee to evaluate the centralizing influence of the FBI, as well as the FBI's role as a check on local law enforcement abuses.

Responsible staff: Senior staff  
Task Force leader  
Mark Gitenstein  
Walter Ricks

### III. Case Studies

#### General Questions

The descriptions which follow of the specific cases the Committee intends to study are intended to serve the dual purpose of notifying the FBI of the issues the Committee will explore in connection with each case and eliciting from the FBI all information and material in its possession relating to the questions the Committee wishes to explore in each case. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition of certain questions which will be basic to the Committee's investigations of each case, certain fundamental questions are set forth below. As to each case described, the Committee intends to explore these fundamental questions, and expects that the FBI will, as to each case, provide all information and material it has relating to these basic questions even though they are not repeated in the discussion of each particular area.

1. What is or has been the legal authority for the activity?
2. What have been the purposes of the activity?
3. What techniques have been employed in the activity?
4. What kinds of information have been gathered in the activity?
5. How have specific uses of the activity been initiated and approved?
6. How have the targets for the activity been selected?
7. What have been the criteria for target selection?
8. How has the intelligence which is collected been used?
9. To whom has the intelligence collected been disseminated?
10. What has been the basis for any dissemination with respect to each recipient?
11. How has the activity been coordinated with other intelligence agencies?

12. What have been the effects of this coordination?
13. To what extent has each of the foregoing been compatible with the legal authority for and the purposes of the activity?
14. By what means has the activity been monitored, controlled and administered?
15. What are the potential abuses to which the activity may lead?
16. To what abuses has the activity led?
17. What steps have been taken to investigate such abuses?
18. What steps have been taken to avoid such abuses?
19. What have been the costs and utility of the activity?

In some instances, the specific questions set forth below may appear to repeat some of the general questions. The purpose in such cases is simply to clarify the application of the general question to the specific case. Except where inapplicable by their terms, all general questions relate to each specific case.

A. Electronic Surveillance

The Committee is examining all forms of electronic interception of communications including wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping, consensual electronic surveillance interception of video and data communications, local monitoring devices, and all other forms of electronic or technical monitoring. The Committee's general questions apply to each of the techniques listed above, as well as to the matters set forth in the following specific cases.

1. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance

The Committee seeks to determine whether the Attorney General should have the authority to authorize electronic surveillance for certain purposes without a prior judicial warrant. This power has been exercised by succeeding Attorneys General since 1940, upon the explicit directive of the President. The Supreme Court has ruled that this power does not extend to purely domestic matters, but the remaining scope of the Attorney General's authority remains undefined by the Supreme Court.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

- a. What is the scope and basis of the claim of Executive authority to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance?
- b. What have been the procedures for consideration and approval of requests for warrantless electronic surveillance authorized by the Attorney General?
- c. What are the specific disadvantages of the judicial warrant requirement for those electronic surveillances which have been authorized by the Attorney General?

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- d. Does the Fourth Amendment permit the issuance of judicial warrants for electronic surveillance on grounds other than ordinary probable cause where national security intelligence purposes are advanced to justify the surveillance?
- e. To what extent are the specific procedures of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 inappropriate for electronic surveillance conducted for national security intelligence purposes?

Documents

The Committee requests the following additional documents bearing on the questions stated above:

- a. All written justifications for the specific authorizations by the Attorney General for warrantless electronic surveillance from January 1, 1960, until the present.
- b. All documents reflecting the denial by the Attorney General of specific requests for warrantless electronic surveillance from January 1, 1960, until the present.
- c. Committee staff access to information contained in the impounded documents, depositions, and other materials in all pending civil suits which involve warrantless electronic surveillance and in which the Committee has received the consent of the plaintiffs for such access.

Responsible staff: Senior staff  
Task Force leader  
Mike Epstein

## 2. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance and "Leaks"

The Committee is examining several instances of the use of warrantless electronic surveillance and other investigative techniques in connection with "leaks" of classified information. These cases may involve specific allegations of abuse or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. These instances include:

- a. The investigation of alleged "leaks" by or to 17 Executive officials and newsmen between May 1969 and February 1971.
- b. The investigation of alleged "leaks" from a military staff member assigned to the National Security Council in 1971-72.
- c. The reported investigation of columnist Joseph Kraft in 1969.
- d. The reported investigation of the activities of Mrs. Anna Chennault and Vice Presidential candidate Spiro Agnew in 1968.
- e. Any other instances of warrantless electronic surveillance in connection with the investigation of "leaks" to the press.

### Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

- a. Through what procedures and by whom were each of these electronic surveillances authorized and approved, continued, and terminated?
- b. As to each person to whom information was disseminated, please state:
  - (1) The nature of the information.
  - (2) The basis for the dissemination.

(3) The date of each dissemination.

(4) The use which was in fact made of the information by the recipient.

- c. What evaluations were made of the original grounds for the surveillance as it progressed?
- d. What were the results of the evaluations?
- e. Who made them?
- f. What are the reasons for use of electronic surveillance without judicial warrant to investigate "leaks" of classified information to the press?
- g. How does each of the above instances relate to these reasons?
- h. To what extent would requirement of a warrant interfere with the ability to detect such leaks?

Responsible staff: Senior staff  
Task Force leader  
Mark Gitenstein

3. Surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King

This investigation examines the authorization for, conduct and termination of, and deliberations regarding the surveillance of Dr. King. This case may involve specific allegations of abuses and other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

- a. Through what procedures and by whom were wiretaps and electronic bugs of Dr. King initiated, approved, continued, and terminated?
- b. What were the locations, extent, and duration of the electronic surveillances of Dr. King?
- c. What were the grounds of national security, if any, for the introduction of the electronic surveillances of Dr. King?
- d. What was the relationship between the information collected and each of the purposes of the surveillance?
- e. What evaluations were made of the original grounds for the surveillance as it progressed?
- f. What were the results of those evaluations?
- g. Who made them?
- h. What periodic evaluations were made of the relationship between the information being collected and the original objectives of the surveillance?
- i. What were the results of the evaluations?
- j. Who made them?

k. To whom were any results of the surveillance disseminated?

1. As to each person to whom information was disseminated, please state

- (1) The nature of the information.
- (2) The basis for the dissemination.
- (3) The date of each dissemination.
- (4) The use which was in fact made of the information.

Responsible staff: Senior staff  
Task Force Leader  
Mike Epstein

4: Surveillance at the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, 1964

The Committee is examining the use of surveillance and other intelligence operations in Atlantic City, New Jersey, on or about the time of the Democratic National Convention in 1964. This case may involve specific allegations of abuses and other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

- AD  
K/11*
- a. Did the FBI conduct electronic surveillance and other intelligence operations at this time and place?
  - b. Who were the targets?
  - c. Through what procedures and by whom were the decisions made to engage in electronic surveillance and intelligence operations at this time and place?
  - d. What were the nature, extent, and duration of the electronic surveillance and other intelligence operations at this time and place?
  - e. What was the relationship between each target selected and the purpose of the surveillance?
  - f. Was the FBI requested to conduct such surveillance by any person or organization outside the FBI?
  - g. If so, by whom, when, and for what stated reason?
  - h. To whom were the results of the surveillance disseminated?
  - i. As to each person whom information was disseminated, please state

- (1) The nature of the information.
- (2) The basis for the dissemination.
- (3) The date of each dissemination.
- (4) The use which was in fact made of the information.

Responsible staff: Senior Staff  
Task Force Leader  
Mike Epstein

B. Surreptitious Entry

The purpose of this inquiry is to determine the extent to which the FBI has used surreptitious entry as an intelligence technique, either through its own operations or through operations by other agencies and individuals. This case may involve allegations of abuse and controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. What are the scope and basis of the claim of Executive authority to conduct warrantless surreptitious entry as asserted by the Department of Justice in United States v. Ehrlichman?
2. What surreptitious entries have been carried out by the FBI or by another government agency with the knowledge of the FBI from January 1, 1960, to the present? Please list by date, place, and target.
3. As to any instance in which the FBI has refused to comply with another agency's request for surreptitious entry, what was
  - a. The basis for the refusal?
  - b. The reason given for the request?
4. What procedures were employed to authorize any surreptitious entry identified under 2, and who authorized each such entry?
5. To the extent applicable by their terms, each of the above questions and the General Questions will be explored specifically with reference to any entry or proposed entry at an embassy in May 1972.

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff  
Task Force Leader  
Mike Epstein  
Paul Wallach

### C. Mail Covers and Mail Openings

The Committee is examining the conduct of mail covers and mail openings by or on behalf of the FBI and any instances of mail openings or intercepts which may have been conducted by or on behalf of the FBI. This inquiry may involve allegations of abuse or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

#### Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. The specific purposes of all mail covers conducted in connection with FBI intelligence and counter-intelligence activities. This includes all documents pertaining to FBI decisions to request Postal Service mail covers and lists of all subjects upon whom mail covers have been placed as a result of FBI requests since January 1, 1960.
2. The procedures and practices for the dissemination of information from mail covers requested by the FBI. This includes a list of all entities to whom mail cover information has been disseminated since January 1, 1960.
3. Whether or not FBI personnel may have conducted mail covers in violation of existing Postal Service regulations. For any mail covers which may have been conducted by FBI personnel or for the FBI by persons other than Postal Service employees, from January 1, 1960, to the present: identify the physical location where the mail cover was conducted, the names of all persons who participated in and authorized the mail cover, and a brief explanation of the purpose of the mail cover and why it was initiated.
4. Whether or not the FBI has opened mail or caused mail to be opened, either with or without the permission of the Postal Service. For all incidents of mail opening which may have been conducted by FBI employees or by other persons in cooperation with the FBI, from January 1, 1960, until the present: identify the physical location where the mail was opened or intercepted, the names of the individuals who participated in the opening or intercept, and the purpose of the opening or intercept.

Documents

The Committee requests the following additional documents bearing on the questions stated above:

1. All documents which discuss, refer to, or relate to the origins, authorizations, conduct, and termination of and procedures for the mail covers, intercepts, and openings identified in 3 and 4 above.

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff  
Task Force Leader  
Paul Wallach

D. Other Specific Techniques

As to the following techniques, the Committee's inquiry will initially be confined to the General Questions. As the inquiry proceeds, areas of potential abuse and thus of specific inquiry beyond the General Questions may develop:

1. Incommunicado detention and interrogation.
2. Photographic and television surveillance.
3. Polygraphs.
4. The obtaining of bank, credit, school, and other personal records and information, including the obtaining of information under false pretext.

E. COINTELPRO and Disruptive Activities

The Committee is investigating the circumstances surrounding the origins of, authorization for, and implementation of the FBI program known as COINTELPRO and any similar programs. This inquiry may involve allegations of abuse and controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. The scope of this investigation covers:

1. COINTELPRO -- Communist Party USA;
2. COINTELPRO -- Socialist Workers Party;
3. COINTELPRO -- White Hate Groups;
4. COINTELPRO -- Black Extremists;
5. COINTELPRO -- New Left;
6. COINTELPRO -- Special Operations (except as targeted against hostile foreign intelligence services);
7. COINTELPRO -- Puerto Rican Independence Groups;
8. COINTELPRO -- Operation Hoodwink
9. Any other activities of the FBI which have or have had the purpose and effect of disrupting domestic groups or discrediting U.S. citizens, whether or not carried out under a COINTELPRO program.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. Under what circumstances, through what procedures, and by whom were these programs initiated, authorized, and terminated?
2. Under what circumstances and through what procedures did the FBI discover and report to the Attorney General the existence of items 7 and 8 identified above and similar disruptive activities not included in the original review of COINTELPRO activities conducted by the Department of Justice in 1974?

3. What were the purposes of each program?
4. In each case, by what means was it intended the purpose would be accomplished?
5. What internal FBI procedures were adopted for the consideration and approval of specific disruptive activities and for determining the results of such activities?
6. As to each operation listed above, and any others of a fundamentally similar kind, identify by type the sources of the information used against individuals and groups for disruptive purposes.
7. As to each instance in which such information was obtained through electronic surveillance
  - (a) What or who was the target of the surveillance?
  - (b) Was the surveillance legal?
  - (c) Was the surveillance conducted pursuant to warrant?
  - (d) What were the dates of the surveillance?
  - (e) What were the precise means of surveillance?
  - (f) Who authorized the surveillance (both within and without the FBI)?
  - (g) What was the purpose of the surveillance?
8. As to each case listed above and all fundamentally similar cases, what was the legality and propriety of the disruptive activities? Should any of the activities referred to in the above sentence be forbidden by statute, considered for future use, or otherwise subject to statutory or administrative regulation?

9. In what activities has the FBI engaged since April 28, 1971, the purpose or effect of which has been to disrupt domestic groups or discredit U.S. citizens or which bear any other similarity to the purposes or effects of COINTELPRO activities?
10. What restrictions, directives, or other measures have been adopted by the FBI and the Justice Department to limit or regulate the use of such disruptive techniques?

The Committee will investigate all COINTELPRO and disruptive activities identified above. On the basis of a review of the summaries of COINTELPRO cases prepared for the so-called Petersen Committee, as well as other sources of information, the Committee will develop further requests for information and documents.

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff  
Task Force Leader  
Les Seidel  
Mike Epstein  
Walter Ricks

F. Clandestine Informant Activities

The Committee is examining all aspects of the FBI's use of informants, sources, and undercover personnel and the techniques employed by such persons. Although informants are the single most productive source of intelligence information, the difficulties of controlling their activities may increase the possibility of improper conduct. The use of informants to infiltrate organizations also may pose dangers to the right of associational privacy. Consequently, proposals have been made for the imposition of a judicial warrant requirement or other safeguards for the use of informants. The Committee seeks to evaluate such proposals as well as the contributions of informants to the accomplishment of legitimate objectives.

In addition, the Committee is examining informant activities with respect to several particular situations and cases. This investigation may involve specific allegations of abuse or controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. The Committee's inquiry covers the general circumstances surrounding the following incidents or cases:

- a. Wounded Knee;
- b. Kent State;
- c. New York v. Stroble (Attica);
- d. United States v. Buckalew (Gainesville);
- e. United States v. Briggs (Camden);
- f. New York v. Dillon (Hobart College);
- g. United States v. Marshall (Seattle).

Additional cases may also be examined.

In addition to the above cases, the Committee is examining the role of FBI informants in providing information to the FBI concerning members of the following organizations:

- a. Ku Klux Klan;
- b. Students for a Democratic Society;
- c. Weathermen;
- d. Black Panther Party;
- e. Communist Party USA;
- f. W.E.B. DuBois Clubs.

Additional studies of informant activities with respect to members of other organizations may be formulated.

#### Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. With respect to both categories of cases listed above, what allegations, whether unfounded or not, of improper, illegal, unethical, or provocative conduct by FBI informants have been made in connection with these situations or groups?
2. What measures has the FBI taken to investigate such allegations of misconduct and to prevent such alleged misconduct from taking place in the future?
3. What instructions has the FBI given to its informants with respect to possible improper, illegal, unethical, or provocative conduct?
4. What has been the largest number of informants, sources, and undercover personnel in use at any one time during each year from 1960 until the present in connection with security, intelligence, and counterintelligence matters, cases, and programs?
5. What has been the annual total amount of funds (including reimbursement for expenses) paid to informants and sources for each year from 1960 until the present?

6. What limits, if any, have been placed on the type of information which informants have been intrusted to report back to the FBI?
7. What have been the annual percentage of potential informants who became paid informants in connection with security, intelligence, and counterintelligence matters, cases, and programs from 1960 until the present?

#### Documents

Please provide a summary of ten cases (for each of the following categories) where the FBI's use of informants, sources, or undercover personnel resulted in:

1. the conviction of an espionage agent of a foreign government.
2. the prevention of the theft of national security information.
3. the prevention of sabotage.
4. the prevention of an act of violence.
5. the prevention of the carrying out of a conspiracy to overthrow the government.
6. any other successful preventive actions in furtherance of the FBI's national security responsibilities.

Responsible staff: Senior staff  
Task Force leader  
Mike Epstein  
Jack Smith  
Walter Ricks  
Pat Shea

G. "Notional" Organizations

The Committee is examining the FBI's alleged creation of the support for "notional" organizations for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes. Although it may rely upon informants and other clandestine operatives, this alleged practice is sufficiently novel to require separate attention.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. What groups, organizations, movements, or other associations has the FBI caused directly or indirectly to be formed or created for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes? Please provide a complete list from January 1, 1960, to the present.
2. What groups, organizations, movements, or other associations has the FBI supported financially or materially? Please provide a complete list from January 1, 1960, to the present.
3. In which cases has the FBI supported or created such organizations in coordination or cooperation with other agencies?
4. How have the presence of such "notional" organizations affected the public's perception of the movements of which they form a part?
5. How have any FBI programs for the creation and support of such groups been coordinated with any similar programs undertaken by the CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies?

Responsible staff: Senior staff  
Task Force leader  
Mike Epstein

## H. Joint FBI-Police Operations

The purpose of this inquiry is to examine certain allegations that joint FBI-police operations resulted in misconduct or abuse. These cases are complex and involve a variety of techniques. Nevertheless, they may indicate some of the most serious problems which may arise in attempting to deal with potentially violent situations.

### 1. The White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Mississippi

The Committee is inquiring into the relationships between the FBI and other law enforcement agencies and private organizations in Mississippi in connection with the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. The purpose of the inquiry is to determine what effect, if any, FBI activities had on the actions of other law enforcement agencies and private individuals with respect to the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in Mississippi. This investigation may involve allegations of abuses or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

### Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

- a. Was this organization a target of FBI COINTELPRO operations?
- b. If so, how and by whom was it selected as a target?
- c. What were the purposes of any disruptive operations directed at it?
- d. To what extent were the purposes achieved?
- e. What disruptive techniques, if any, were employed?

- f. Over what period of time did the disruptive activities occur?
- g. What evaluations were made of their effects?
- h. By whom were they made?
- i.. What were the results of the evaluations?
- j. Were FBI informants used to infiltrate the organization?
- k. If so, what kinds of information did the informants gather?
- l. What activities did the informants engage in other than information gathering?
- m. Identify by date and names the persons involved in all contacts the FBI had with other law enforcement agencies and private groups and individuals with respect to alleged Klan bombings of Jewish synagogues and the homes of Jewish leaders in Meridian, Mississippi, during May - August 1968.

Responsible staff: Senior staff  
Task Force leader  
Jack Smith  
Les Seidel

2. The Black Panther Party, Chicago

The Committee is inquiring into the relationships between the FBI and other law enforcement agencies in the Chicago area in connection with the Chicago chapter of the Black Panther Party. The purpose of the inquiry is to determine what effect, if any, FBI activities had on the actions of other law enforcement and intelligence agencies with respect to the Black Panther Party in the Chicago area. This investigation may involve allegations of abuses or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

- a. Was the Chicago chapter of the Black Panther Party a target of FBI COINTELPRO operations?
- b. If so, how and by whom was it selected as a target?
- c. What were the purposes of any disruptive operations directed at it?
- d. To what extent were the purposes achieved?
- e. What disruptive techniques, if any, were employed?
- f. Over what period of time did the disruptive activities occur?
- g. What evaluations were made of their effects?
- h. By whom were they made?
- i. If FBI informants were used to infiltrate the organization, what kinds of information did the informants gather?

- j. What techniques did the informants employ to gather the information?
- k. Were the techniques used by the informants all approved and monitored by the FBI? If not, which were not so approved?
- l. What activities did the informants engage in other than information gathering?
- m. What other methods and sources did the FBI use to gather intelligence on the organization?
- n. If electronic surveillance was used, how did the use of such surveillance relate to each of the general questions?
- o. To what extent was information on persons and groups not members of or affiliated with the Black Panther Party gathered, stored, or disseminated by the FBI as a result of its investigations of the organization?

—Responsible staff: Senior staff  
Task Force leader  
Walter Ricks  
Chris Pyle

## I. The "Huston Plan"

The Committee is examining the FBI's role in the disposition of the report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) in 1970. This report as submitted to the President included certain options which were specifically identified as "illegal". It purported to represent the joint recommendations of all members of the U. S. intelligence community, but FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover disagreed in a series of footnotes.

The serious consideration given to such allegedly illegal proposals gives this case the utmost significance for the Committee's understanding of the risks of uncontrolled intelligence activity. This case may involve specific allegations of abuse and controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

### Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. What contacts occurred between Tom Charles Huston and personnel of the FBI and the Department of Justice during 1969 and 1970? Identify by date and names of persons involved.
2. What was the purpose of each such contact?
3. With respect to any assistance provided to the Interdepartmental Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) by personnel of the FBI:
  - a. Who were the FBI participants?
  - b. What kind of assistance was provided?
  - c. What was the role of the FBI in preparing the various drafts of the special report of the Committee?

4. What were the specific arguments advanced for the inclusion of the allegedly illegal options in the special report submitted for the President's consideration? Were other allegedly illegal options considered and rejected?
5. Were any measures taken by the FBI to implement specific elements of the Huston Plan? This includes both the allegedly "illegal" aspects and other provisions such as the expanded recruitment of 18-21 year old informants.
6. What are the present views of the FBI and the Department of Justice as to the legality and propriety of the various options included in the special report?

Responsible staff: Senior staff  
Task Force leader  
Barbara Banoff  
Loch Johnson

J. Alleged Political Misuse of the FBI

The Committee is investigating allegations that the intelligence and investigative resources of the FBI have been misused by various Presidents, Attorneys General, Members of Congress, and FBI executives themselves. This subject may involve specific allegations of abuse and other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

Questions

The Committee requests that the FBI and the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. Have persons outside the FBI sought the FBI's assistance for partisan political purposes or personal advantage? Please identify each instance by the name of the person seeking to so use the FBI, the date, and the nature of the assistance sought.
2. In each such case, what has been the response of the FBI?
3. Have persons inside or outside the FBI sought to employ the resources of the FBI for purposes outside the FBI's authority? Please identify each instance by the name of the person seeking to so use the FBI, the date, and the purpose for which the person sought to use the FBI.
4. In each such case, what has been the response of the FBI?
5. What measures has the FBI employed to
  - a. Respond to critics.
  - b. Affect the reputation or credibility of or otherwise discredit critics.
6. What were the nature, purpose, duration, and results of Project INLET involving preparation of an intelligence letter for the President and other Executive officials?

7. With respect to any so-called "secret files" maintained within the FBI, including the "official and confidential" and "personal and confidential" files maintained by the executive assistant to the FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover on his behalf until the time of his death, the Committee seeks to establish the contents of such files, the circumstances surrounding the transfer of a portion of such files within the Bureau at the time of Director Hoover's death, the transfer of a portion of such files to Mr. Hoover's residence, the destruction of any such files, the transfer of any such files from Mr. Hoover's residence, the use of information within such files, and their relationship to the official investigative files of the FBI. The Committee desires all information bearing on these matters, including the results of any inquiries conducted within the FBI and the Department of Justice.
8. What measures have been taken to ensure that the intelligence and investigative resources of the FBI are not misused for political purposes or personal advantage.
9. What additional measures should be taken?

Responsible Staff: Senior Staff  
Task Force Leader  
Mark Gitenstein

#### IV. Department of Justice

The Committee is examining activities of divisions of the Justice Department other than the FBI which perform internal security and intelligence functions. The purpose of these inquiries is to determine whether these functions have been carried out in conformity with the rule of law.

##### A. The Attorney General

The Committee is studying the functions of the Attorney General with respect to the supervision of and policy-making for internal security and intelligence activities. The Committee seeks to determine whether his duties are properly defined and his office properly organized to perform these functions effectively.

##### Questions

The Committee requests that the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. To what extent has the Attorney General been involved in the consideration or approval of the policies and activities of U. S. foreign and military intelligence agencies?
2. Has the Justice Department made any agreements with the CIA or any other U. S. intelligence agency with regard to the investigation or prosecution of agency personnel?
3. Under what circumstances and for what purposes has the Office of Legal Counsel provided legal advice to the Attorney General on matters pertaining to foreign and domestic intelligence activities?
4. To what extent has the Attorney General authorized cooperation, including the exchange of information and the conduct of joint operations, between the Drug Enforcement Administration or its predecessors and the CIA or other

intelligence agencies with respect to narcotics intelligence?

5. What standards and procedures has the Attorney General adopted for:
  - a.. The collection, analysis, use, and dissemination of narcotics intelligence.
  - b. The collection, analysis, use, and dissemination of organized crime intelligence.
  - c. The use of intelligence information by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
  - d. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grants for the support of state or local police intelligence activities and intelligence data systems.
6. To what extent have communications between the White House and the FBI or other agencies under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General bypassed the Attorney General? To what extent should such communications be channeled through the Attorney General?
7. What have been the policies and procedures of the Justice Department for evaluating the budget requests of the FBI for intelligence and counterintelligence activities?

Responsible staff: Senior staff  
Task Force leader  
Mark Gitenstein  
Barbara Danoff

B. The Internal Security Section (formerly Division)

The Committee is examining the activities of the Internal Security Section of the Justice Department and its predecessor, the Internal Security Division. These entities have supervised the Department's internal security law enforcement activities, coordinated certain interdepartmental internal security policies, and engaged in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence.

Questions

The Committee requests that the Justice Department address the following specific questions:

1. Under what circumstances, if any, has the Justice Department seriously considered prosecutions under the Smith Act and laws pertaining to seditious conspiracy, rebellion, or insurrection, or "subversive activities", since January 1, 1960?
2. To what extent has FBI intelligence activity provided valuable evidence for use in the prosecution of specific federal crimes?
3. What have been the practices and procedures for coordination of policy through the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security?
4. What have been the practices and procedures for the interdepartmental and interagency evaluation of domestic intelligence and domestic collection of foreign intelligence through the Intelligence Evaluation Committee and its predecessors?
5. With respect to the Interdivisional Intelligence Unit and the Analysis and Evaluation Section of the Internal Security Division,
  - a. What have been the practices and procedures of the Unit and Section for the gathering of intelligence?

- b. What type of information has been stored in readily retrievable form by the Unit and Section?
  - c. To whom and for what reasons has intelligence information been disseminated by the Unit and Section?
  - d. What were the reasons for the submission of IDIU computer printouts to the CIA, as reportedly occurred in 1969?
  - e. To what extent did the Unit and Section make specific requests to other agencies within and outside the Justice Department for intelligence information?
6. With respect to the use of grand juries by the Special Litigation Section of the Internal Security Division,
- a. Have any allegations of misuse of the grand jury process in cases handled by Special Litigation Section attorneys come to the attention of the Department? If so, briefly describe each such allegation and what, if any, action was taken by the Department in response to such allegation.
  - b. To what extent, if any, did the use of grand juries in cases handled by the Special Litigation Section attorneys differ from the use of grand juries in cases handled by other sections of the Justice Department?
  - c. To what extent, if any, was information obtained through the use of grand juries included in the intelligence files of the Interdivisional Intelligence Unit or the Analysis and Evaluation Section?

7. What have been the practices and procedures of the Internal Security Division and the Departmental Security Office for advising the Attorney General and other executive agencies with regard to the Federal Employee Security Program?

Responsible staff: Senior staff  
Task Force leader  
Barbara Banoff

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

DATE: 6/26/75

- 1 - Mr. F. S. Putman
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

On 6/26/75 James J. Angleton, former Chief, Counterintelligence Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, telephonically furnished the following information to SA L. F. Schwartz. (S) (u)

Angleton recently testified under oath before three Senators and Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC). He appeared without counsel. During his testimony, Angleton was asked numerous questions concerning his knowledge of Israeli capabilities to conduct intelligence collection in the United States. Among the questions asked Angleton were questions bearing on Israeli efforts to gather nuclear information in the United States. Angleton indicated that the SSC apparently is aware of Angleton's past close relationship with the Israelis, and Angleton feels that the questions directed to him by the SSC may be related to information provided to the Committee by correspondent Tad Szulc who, according to Angleton, is writing an article concerning Angleton's relationship with the Israelis for Penthouse Magazine. Angleton understands that Szulc has either testified or has been interviewed by the SSC. (S) (u)

Angleton stated that he avoided any direct answers on the above questions by stating that any knowledge he might have would be secondhand and fragmentary. He advised the SSC that such questions might more properly be directed to the FBI. When asked who in the Bureau might be knowledgeable in this (S) (u)

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Declassify on: OADR 10/31/89

C.A. # 88-1826

SP 1 CC/ALM #88-1826

7/27/94 C.A. #88-1826  
CIA INFO IS UNCLASSIFIED  
per CIA review of 3/17/94

CONTINUED - OVER

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Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: Senstudy 75  
62-116395

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area, Angleton replied that he did not know but that he believed the current senior Bureau official concerned with operational matters to be Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams. (S) (u)

In addition, Angleton advised that certain questions he was asked dealt with alleged Soviet attempts to infiltrate the CIA and other agencies. Again, Angleton avoided a direct answer and indicated that the FBI would be the appropriate agency to direct such questions to. Finally, Angleton commented that in the event the Bureau thought it desirable he would be happy to personally brief the Director or other appropriate Bureau official concerning his testimony. He commented that he has not been asked to, nor has he offered to, brief William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, concerning his testimony. (u) (S)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. We are checking for any available information in files concerning [Israeli intelligence collection capabilities in the United States.] Results will be summarized in separate memorandum. (S)

2. It is not believed appropriate to request Angleton to brief the Director or other Bureau official concerning his testimony, particularly since Angleton has not seen fit to brief his former superiors at CIA. A request by the Bureau for a briefing by Angleton might be misconstrued if it were to come to the attention of Colby or other CIA officials. (S) (u)

WBS

WBS

WBS

JBA  
PCH

WBS

WBS

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
 1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
 1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford  
 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
 July 3, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

**U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
 STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
 RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum concerning a contact made by the Staff of captioned Committee with Mr. Harry Eugene Schafer and his spouse, Mrs. Jill D. Schafer. It is noted that the Schafers, until March, 1975, served as confidential informants of this Bureau. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 10-13-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJ  
 MDP-16

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
 Attention: K. William O'Connor  
 Special Counsel for  
 Intelligence Coordination

1 - 134-16380 (Harry Eugene Schafer)  
 1 - 134-19699 (Jill D. Schafer)

PWC:dew  
 (13)

REC-107

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- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
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- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_

1- ENCLOSURE

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134-16380-  
 134-19699-

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

July 3, 1975

1 - Mr. D. Ryan  
1 - Mr. P. W. Cook

**U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)**

**RE: CONTACT OF MR. HARRY EUGENE SCHAFER  
AND HIS SPOUSE, MRS. JILL D. SCHAFER,  
WITH STAFF MEMBERS OF THE SSC**

Mr. Harry Eugene Schafer and his spouse, Mrs. Jill D. Schafer, served as confidential informants of the FBI until March, 1975. Immediately prior to that date they were identified as sources of the FBI by Joseph Alfred Burton, a former confidential informant of the FBI. Since his discontinuance as an FBI source in July, 1974, Burton has been publicly attacking the FBI for alleged improprieties and illegal activities. Burton's charges are distorted and in some instances false.

On May 21, 1975, Mr. and Mrs. Schafer made available to our New Orleans Office a copy of a letter addressed to them dated May 14, 1975, signed by Michael T. Epstein, Counsel, of the SSC. In this letter Mr. Epstein requested the Schafers telephone him collect to discuss some matters relating to the current SSC inquiry.

Subsequently, Mr. and Mrs. Schafer voluntarily contacted the New Orleans Office of the FBI to advise that at the invitation of Mr. Epstein they had traveled to Washington, D. C., on June 7, 1975, to converse with representatives of the SSC. Mr. and Mrs. Schafer indicated Mr. Epstein had offered to reimburse them for the expenses of this travel. The Schafers advised that upon their arrival in Washington, D. C., at the appointed hour, they went to Mr. Epstein's office. Mr. Epstein introduced himself and two colleagues, a male named Marshal Elliott, described as a representative of Senator Schweiker, and Mary De Oreo, a female researcher.

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DATE 10-13-2001 BY SP2ALM/KJP  
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Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

1 - 134-16380 (Harry Eugene Schafer)  
1 - 134-19699 (Jill D. Schafer)

PWC:dew/rsm (12)

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO THE  
ATTORNEY GENERAL

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

**SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)**

**RE: CONTACT OF MR. AND MRS. SCHAFER WITH STAFF MEMBERS OF SSC**

According to the Schafers, Mr. Epstein began the interview with the Schafers by stating the purpose of the Senate Committee and why the Schafers were asked to Washington, D. C. Mr. Epstein stated that the Committee was trying to develop information on what the U. S. intelligence agencies have been doing, what changes in these agencies are needed and "where mistakes might have happened."

The Schafers advised they requested Mr. Epstein to ask them specific questions. He asked them what was the entire period of time of the Schafers' relationship with the FBI and if they were still associated with the Bureau. Mr. Schafer told Mr. Epstein that he was not going to admit any association with the FBI at this point and the reply seemed to greatly upset Mr. Epstein. He asked the Schafers why they had come to Washington, D. C. The Schafers replied they wanted to establish some groundwork for any relationship with the Senate Committee. Mr. Epstein attempted to have the Schafers relate their activities in behalf of the FBI. Mr. Schafer advised they refused to comply due to Mr. Epstein's manner and presentation. The Schafers stated they received the definite impression that Mr. Epstein and his colleagues expected to hear an afternoon of interesting stories and anecdotes.

Mrs. Schafer told Mr. Epstein that they had done nothing wrong, illegal, immoral or unethical in their "movement" activities and they were proud of their contributions to the nation's internal security. The Schafers related they enjoyed a happy relationship with the FBI and they knew of nothing questionable or unprofessional regarding the Bureau's handling of their information. The Schafers said they made it clear that they would be happy to tell the SSC these things; however, since they were not reassured by Mr. Epstein, and were in fact put off by his manner and his colleagues' brusque reactions, they would not furnish anything further to Mr. Epstein. The Schafers stated that short of appearing before the Senate Committee, they wanted to be left alone.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: CONTACT OF MR. AND MRS. SCHAFER WITH STAFF MEMBERS OF SSC

According to the Schafers, Mr. Epstein and his colleagues gave the clear impression that they were disappointed and annoyed with the Schafers' reluctance to tell them anything. Mr. Epstein asked if the Schafers wanted to talk to any of the Senators and the Schafers stated they would be willing to speak to Senator Goldwater; however, Mr. Epstein made no specific arrangements other than to check with Charlie Lombard, Goldwater's representative. Mr. Epstein did not say if the Schafers would be subpoenaed; nor were any firm arrangements made about reimbursing them for their expenses. According to the Schafers, the meeting broke up rather abruptly and Mr. Epstein's colleagues left without saying good-by.

The Schafers stated they made an effort to be friendly, cooperative and amenable to Mr. Epstein and his colleagues, and they made a good faith gesture in appearing before Mr. Epstein in Washington, D. C.

NOTE:

The Schafers, as paid informants, furnished information from October, 1969, until March, 1975, to the Bureau. Information in this LHM was contained in New Orleans teletype to the Director, dated June 11, 1975. Several personal statements made by the Schafers, such as "bearded hippy" in reference to one of Epstein's colleagues, were not included in the LHM as this type of information is not fully germane and our reporting of it might be inferred as our being prejudicial.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:  
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

7/3/75

DOCUMENT

BRIEFING

☒

INTERVIEW

TESTIMONY

OTHER

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC

Memorandum furnished to the Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum reports results of interview by SSC Staff Members of Harry E. Schafer and his spouse, Jill D. Schafer, formerly confidential informants of the FBI.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

U

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

See (8)

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Interview failed to provide SSC any significant information due to an unfriendly atmosphere created by the participants resulting in an early termination of the interview.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-13-2000 BY SP2AUN/24  
MPR-16

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395

SFP:1hb  
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

woc/8  
5- file

## INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 7-2-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

WRW

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities requested a staff interview with former Special Agent David E. Todd about COINTELPRO and the investigation at San Francisco of the Black Panther Party.

At the direction of Bureau teletype 6-9-75, San Francisco on 6-11-75, advised Todd of above and that he was released from the applicable employee secrecy agreement for the purpose of the Staff interview.

By letter dated June 11, 1975, Mr. Todd said the interview "may involve information disseminated to other Government agencies under security classification and may touch on foreign policy as well."

Mr. Todd asked:

1. For written confirmation of the release given him orally as well as a release from the provisions of any applicable executive orders;
2. If there is "any limitation on the scope of the material" he may release; and
3. Whether he will be permitted to "refresh my recollection by reviewing official files prior to or during the interview."

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
- 1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
- 1 - Mr. Cregar - Enc.
- 1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
- 1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
- 1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.
- 1 - Personal File Special Agent David E. Todd - Enc.
- 1 - Mr. Miller - Enc.

REC-107

62-116395-326

3 JUL 9 1975

5-8

JDM: PVD:EEK  
(10)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

LEGAL COUNSEL

94 JUL 1 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Legal Counsel to Adams, Memo  
Re: SENSTUDY 75

We have prepared an airtel to San Francisco with an enclosed letter for Mr. Todd in response to his request. We are having the San Francisco Office hand deliver the letter so that any questions he may have can be answered.

We have not regarded requests for interviews as "demands" within the meaning of 28 CFR 16.22; therefore, no release from the Department is necessary.

Regarding his request for access to Bureau files, we have not had former employees make this request previously. Our position should be that they not have access but rather rely on their recollection. If they cannot answer a specific question, the Committee can be referred to the Bureau.

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached Airtel with enclosed letter to Mr. Todd be approved and sent.

*JSA*

*[Signature]*

*JBR  
Pm*

*WFW*



DAVID E TODD  
20 COZZOLINO DR  
MILLBRAE CA 94030

Airmail

CP#75-6203

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11/30/83 BY SP-2799R/RS

Mr. Clarence M. Kelley,  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
U. S. Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C. 20535

~~84 JUL 1 1975~~

20 JUL 17 1975

EC-107

62-116395-325

3 JUL 9 1975

JUL 2 1975

RECEIVED  
FOIA SECTION

RECEIVED

JUN 18 5 18 PM 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

20 Cozzolino Drive  
Millbrae, California 94030  
June 11, 1975

Mr. Clarence M. Kelley  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Kelley:

On this date Supervisor Berryman of the San Francisco Office read to me a teletype to the effect the Bureau had approved a secrecy release for me to respond to questions from Senate investigator Lester B. Seidel in connection with a Senate Select Committee on Internal Security investigation of the CoIntelPro as it related to the Black Panther Party. A copy of a letter from me to Mr. Seidel has been furnished to the Bureau previously.

At the time I was designated supervisor of the squad handling internal security investigations of the Black Panther Party (BPP), the BPP was international in scope; Eldridge Cleaver and others had been granted asylum in Algeria; the BPP had support and/or branches in France, Germany, Scandinavia and China. Aspects of the counter intelligence program approved by the Bureau of which I am aware were directed against some BPP foreign operations. Thus, interrogation by the Senate investigator may involve information disseminated to other government agencies under security classification and may touch on foreign policy as well.

Therefore, prior to furnishing information obtained in an official capacity to Mr. Seidel, who according to the Bureau's teletype will be in San Francisco in about two weeks, I would like written confirmation of the release which was furnished me orally, preferably an official document covering any secrecy agreement made with the Bureau as well as releasing me from the provisions of any applicable executive orders which preclude disclosure of official information without approval of the Attorney General or an authorized Departmental officer. I would also appreciate being advised if there is any limitation on the scope of the material which I may release.

Since the Bureau's teletype also approved a secrecy release for current SAC Charles Bates, this presupposes he will be authorized to furnish Mr. Seidel with the contents of files if Mr. Seidel so requests. Therefore, I would also appreciate advice as to whether I will be permitted to refresh my recollection by reviewing official files prior to or during the interview with Mr. Seidel.

Sincerely yours,

David E. Todd  
Retired Special Agent

cc: SAC San Francisco

84 JUL 21 1975

July 2, 1975

airtel

To: SAC, San Francisco (62-6887)  
From: Director, FBI (62-116395)  
Subject: SENSTUDY 75

CA#75-6203  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/30/83 BY SP-5 TAP/RE

ReButel June 9, 1975.

Enclosed is a letter from the Director to former Special Agent David E. Todd. You, an ASAC, or Senior Supervisor please hand deliver enclosed letter to Mr. Todd immediately.


You are reminded of a memorandum to all employees, Re: "INTERVIEWS OF FBI EMPLOYEES," in which the Director advised this Bureau has pledged its cooperation with the Congress.

Enclosure

1-Mr. Adams  
1-Mr. Wannall  
1-Mr. Cregar  
1-Mr. Mintz  
1-Mr. Hotis  
1-Mr. Daly  
1-Personal File Special Agent David E. Todd  
1-Mr. Miller

PVD:lgp  
(12)

ENCLOSURE



Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_

REC-107

62-116395-324  
116-116395-324  
3 JUL 9 1975

1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Cregar  
1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. Hotis  
1 - Mr. Daly

July 2, 1975

1 - Personnel File Special Agent  
David E. Todd  
1 - Mr. Miller

Mr. David E. Todd  
20 Cozzolino Drive  
Millbrae, California 94030

Dear Mr. Todd:

Thank you for your letter of June 11, 1975.

You are released from the FBI Employment Agreement for the purpose of a Staff interview by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities concerning COINTELPRO and the investigation at San Francisco, California, of the Black Panther Party.

I am not aware of any other release you may require.

Pursuant to your request of June 11, 1975, a Special Agent will be available during the interview to assist you in making a determination whether or not a response should be made to a particular question. This Agent is not to be considered private counsel and he will not be present during the interview.

FBI files will not be made available for the interview.

Sincerely yours,

REC-107

Clarence M. Kelley  
Director

ENCLOSURE

3 JUL 9 1975

CA#75-6203  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/30/83 BY SP-3 JTA/P/RBG

JDM:PVD:EEK  
(13)

NOTE: Former SA Todd signed a secrecy agreement with the Bureau on 12-3-62.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall *WRW/tul*

FROM : W. O. Cregar *WOC/LFS*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland  
DATE: 6/27/75  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

On 6/27/75 James J. Angleton, former Chief, Counter Intelligence Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), telephonically advised SA L. F. Schwartz that he has been in contact with Herbert Itkin, former Bureau Criminal Informant who also had a relationship with CIA. Angleton advised that Itkin is being interviewed today at a local hotel by a Mr. Shea from the Senate Select Committee.

Itkin was successfully operated as a Top Echelon Criminal Informant from April, 1963, until February, 1968, when he was discontinued. He has testified in a number of Bureau cases and his past relationship with CIA and the Bureau has been publicized. We have not been in contact with Itkin for several years.

Angleton advised that he expects that Itkin will contact him some time after completion of his interview and if Angleton learns any information of interest to the Bureau he will advise us.

Angleton also commented that he is being interviewed himself today by Senate Select Committee representatives regarding his knowledge of the "Huston Report."

## ACTION:

For information.

LFS:adn  
(7)  
62-116395

REC-107 62-116395-323

3 JUL 9 1975

84 JUL 11 1975

CODE

TELETYPE

NITEL

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. J. Cochran, Jr.

JUNE 27, 1975

TO SACS ATLANTA

KNOXVILLE

BIRMINGHAM

LOS ANGELES

PERSONAL ATTENTION

ALBANY

TAMPA

(Attn: T. J. Brownfield)

JACKSONVILLE

CHICAGO

- 1 - Mr. W. M. Mooney  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.

INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) CONCERNING A NUMBER OF PRESENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING THEIR CURRENT WHEREABOUTS, SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF CONCERNING BUREAU'S FORMER INVESTIGATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES AND OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF INCUMBENTS, ALL OF WHOM SSC HAS INQUIRED ABOUT.

EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC STAFF ABOUT THE KING INVESTIGATION. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT

2- ENCLOSURE

IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

SFP:1hb

(11) DEBBE RIVIL  
VEGETIAC

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 27 1975

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-16-200 BY SP7AUM/pf

REC-107

62-116395-322  
SEE NOTE PAGE 3

3 JUL 9 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☒

PAGE TWO 62-116395

SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS, TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE AND ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS), THEY MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.

INCUMBENT EMPLOYEES TO BE ADVISED THAT IF CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF FOR INTERVIEW, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION TO BE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED THROUGH SAC.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE IS NO LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD

PAGE THREE 62-116395

ATLANTA: INCUMBENTS - DONALD P. BURGESS, RICHARD E. FUGATT, EDMUND F. HAGGERTY, O. RICHARD HAMILTON, CHARLES T. HAYNES, WILBUR W. SEITZER, ROBERT W. THOMSON. FORMER - MARION E. CHEEK, 1613 GAIL AVENUE, ALBANY, GEORGIA 31705; CHARLES T. HARDING, 2243 PINECLIFF DRIVE, NORTHEAST, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30345.

BIRMINGHAM: LAWRENCE T. GURLEY, 1340 WESTMINISTER PLACE, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA 35235.

ALBANY: HENRY G. ROWSE, JR., 39 NORTH MAIN STREET, ENOSBURG FALLS, VERMONT 05450.

JACKSONVILLE: WILLIAM LEE BOLYARD - INCUMBENT.

KNOXVILLE: W. JOHN BENTON - INCUMBENT.

LOS ANGELES: JAMES M. KELLOGG - INCUMBENT.

TAMPA: JAMES E. MCMAHON, 3110 COCOS ROAD, TAMPA, FLORIDA 33618.

CHICAGO: JOHN BASSETT - INCUMBENT.

NOTE:

Legal Counsel Division has obtained an advanced copy of a letter dated 6/24/75 from John T. Elliff of the SSC Staff to K. William O'Connor of the Deputy AG's Office (copy attached) which makes reference to prior SSC requests concerning the King investigation and asks for the present offices of assignment or last known addresses of 19 individuals. The list had 21 names, two of which were duplicates. Several

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 4

PAGE FOUR 62-116395

NOTE CONTINUED:

of the names were misspelled but we have been able to fairly well establish that the individuals they are interested in are those listed above. Included in the list were the following supervisors presently assigned at FBIHQ: William D. Campbell - Laboratory, Joseph H. O'Rourke - Training Division and Timothy Dorch - INTD. The caution taken herein in alerting former employees, as well as incumbents, is same we have taken by previous teletypes to selected SACs. After dispatch instant teletype, copies will be filed in personnel files of all named herein. The referenced 5/2/75 teletype was to all offices furnishing background regarding Senstudy 75. We are separately handling necessary response to the SSC.

OFFICE OF THE  
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL



June 26, 1975

TO: Paul Daly

FROM: Bill O'Connor

Please obtain the requested  
addresses and return to me in a form  
to be provided to the SSC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2PUM/BF  
MDP-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-322

FBI

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN  
 JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN  
 PHILIP M. HART, MICH.  
 WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.  
 WALTER D. HODGES, KY.  
 ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.  
 GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR  
 FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL  
 CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

# United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
 STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
 RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

RECEIVED

JUN 26 1975

June 24, 1975

K. William O'Connor, Esq.  
 Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination  
 Office of the Deputy Attorney General  
 U. S. Department of Justice  
 Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

FBI  
 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 10-1-2000 BY SP2AUM/24  
 MDP-16

Pursuant to our telephone conversation of this date, I am making the following request which relates to matters originally covered in Appendix D, items 5, 6, 9, 13, and 20.

Please provide the present offices of assignment or last known addresses of the following agents or former agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation:

Donald Burgess  
 Robert T. Thompson  
 Richard Hamilton  
 Charles Haynes  
 John Benton  
 James Kellogg  
 James McCann  
 Henry Rouse  
 Charles Harding  
 Charles Haynes  
 Richard Hamilton  
 Timothy Gorch  
 Richard Fuggett  
 Larry Gurley  
 John Bassett  
 Marion Cheek  
 Ed Hagerty  
 William Sitiesis  
 Joseph O'Rorick  
 William Bolliard  
 William D. Campbell

Noted to Paul Daly  
 Pls obtain the requested  
 addresses & ret to me  
 via form to be provided  
 to SSC 1/13

Handwritten: *Send to Paul Daly for  
 Action today 6/26/75  
 7/1 B.*

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS


DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

JUN 25 1975

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL



62-116395-322 file  
 62-116395-5-8

ENCLOSURE


K. William O'Connor, Esq.  
Page Two

June 24, 1975

All of these individuals are believed to possess information relevant to the Martin Luther King matter. With the exception of Mr. Gurley and Mr. Campbell, all of these persons are believed to have served at either the Atlanta or Albany, Georgia, office of the FBI. We understand that Mr. Gurley and Mr. Campbell were at one time assigned to headquarters.

It would be most helpful if this information could be provided telephonically to Mr. Michael T. Epstein of our staff.

Sincerely,



John T. Elliff  
Director

Domestic Intelligence Task Force

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/25/75

FROM : W. O. Gregar

ORIGINAL ONLY

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

## PURPOSE:

To advise that representatives of Intelligence Division this date reviewed 693-page CIA document containing information relating to joint ventures involving CIA and other members of intelligence community in sensitive matters, and a specific request has been made for CIA to furnish this Bureau with copies of all material contained therein believed to have a bearing on FBI activities.

## DETAILS:

By memorandum 6/24/75 you were advised that arrangements had been effected whereby a CIA representative would on 6/25/75 bring to FBIHQ a copy of the 693-page document containing a series of memoranda and reports prepared by CIA citing instances wherein CIA may have engaged in activities outside the perimeter of its charter. As you have been advised, members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) have had prior access to this document and it contains numerous references to FBI-CIA joint ventures, some of which are of an extremely sensitive nature. CIA Director William Colby authorized a review of this document and agreed to this Bureau obtaining a copy of material contained therein believed pertinent to this Bureau's operations.

REC-102

62-116395-321

On 6/25/75, Mrs. Harriet Mowitt, Executive Secretary of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group, appeared at Bureau Headquarters with the 693-page document divided into three packages. These

62-116395

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

3 JUL 7 1975

TJM:1hb/1hb  
(1)

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: Senstudy 75  
62-116395

packages were reviewed by Section Chief William O. Cregar and Special Agents Leon F. Schwartz and Thomas J. McNiff in Room 4123 JEH.

Material contained therein runs the entire gambit from CIA cooperation, and in some instances financing, of Bureau sensitive operations in foreign intelligence field, to CIA involvement in domestic affairs including cooperation with police departments and other Federal agencies. In all, it was determined that approximately 174 pages of the document contain information which in some respect has a bearing on this Bureau's operations.

Pertinent page numbers were identified to Mrs. Mowitt and she is taking this Bureau's request for these pages back to CIA Headquarters for the purpose of obtaining authorization to furnish this Bureau with copies of the pages in which this Bureau is interested. Mrs. Mowitt advised that she would insure our request in this respect received expeditious attention and she will furnish us with the results at the earliest time.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. Above submitted for information. You will be kept advised of developments.

TJM  
LPS

*[Handwritten signature]*  
jma

per

WRW  
Jan 11  
76

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: June 20, 1975

FROM : Legal Counsel *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75 (62-116395)

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is a FD 302 reporting a conversation SA Paul V. Daly had with Mr. Paul Wallach, staff member of United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. The gist of the conversation is that Mr. Wallach informed SA Daly that he had a list of national security mail covers which cover the last five years and that he would use this list for committee business including for interview purposes if the Bureau did not promptly comply with the Committee's request for a list of mail covers.

The contents of the attached FD 302, were orally furnished on 6-18-75 to Deputy Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Michael Shaheen of the Department. Mr. Shaheen and Mr. O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, contacted F. A. O. Schwartz, Chief Counsel to the Senate Select Committee, to protest Mr. Wallach's actions. Mr. Wallach denied, in a conversation with Mr. O'Connor, that he had stated he had such a list to SA Daly. Subsequent to this conversation with Mr. O'Connor, and on the same day according to Mr. Shaheen, Wallach called Shaheen and told Shaheen that he wanted to talk to him off the record, at which point Mr. Wallach stated that he had access to a list of mail covers through a source of his, but did not have possession of same. He also stated that he may have suggested to SA Daly that he had such a list.

Mr. Shaheen stated that it was obvious that Wallach could not be trusted and remarked that the Department had been keeping book on him. Shaheen informed SA Daly that Wallach

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Wannall - Enc.
- 1 - Mr. Cregar - Enc.
- 1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
- 1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
- 1 - Mr. Daly - Enc.

PVD:EEK

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DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2AUM/SP

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REC-102

15 JUL 3 1975

LEGAL COUNSEL

FILE



84 JUL 8 1975

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams, Memo  
RE: SENSTUDY 75

had contacted Mr. Cox, Chief Counsel for the United States Postal Service, at which time he informed Mr. Cox that the White House had authorized the release of all national security mail covers, and requested Cox furnish same to him. According to Shaheen, Cox then contacted the White House to determine if Wallach's story was in fact true, at which time James Wilderotter, Assistant Counsel to the President, advised that Wallach's name was unfamiliar to him, and that he had not been given authority to obtain national security mail covers. Mr. Shaheen stated he, at the direction of Mr. O'Connor, was furnishing the Bureau in writing, a report of his conversations with Wallach and also stated that O'Connor stated he would no longer have any dealings with Wallach because of the obvious unethical conduct and lack of honesty on Wallach's part.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

*pd jst*

*[Signature]*

*[Signature]*

*[Signature]*

*Bm*

*Jm*

*[Signature]*

161  
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DATE 11-20-2000 BY SPAN/JP

MDR/16



Enclosure

116395

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 6-18-75

Mr. Paul Wallach, staff member of the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, telephonically contacted me on 6-18-75 between 2:30 and 3 o'clock P. M., and inquired as to the status of a request by the Committee concerning mail cover information. He asked if I could furnish him a time when he might expect our response to be delivered to him. He pointed out that he had had previous discussions with me and Mr. Shaheen of the Department concerning this matter, and Mr. Shaheen had indicated to him that he could expect the response to have been given to him by this time. Mr. Wallach was informed that a time certain for delivery of a response concerning this request could not be given, and it was explained to him that a vast amount of material was being reviewed pursuant to request of the Senate Select Committee and other committees of Congress and that because of the amount of work involved in all these requests it was not possible to make a judgment as to the date of the response.

Mr. Wallach indicated he felt he had been misled by Mr. Shaheen into believing that he would have a response to his request and that he was going to recontact Mr. Shaheen. He made a general inquiry as to whether one Agent might be gathering all the information and as to whether he might be allowed to come to FBI Headquarters and review what has been gathered to this point. He was informed that all disclosures have to receive proper Bureau approval and that it would not be possible for him to review such information in the absence of such approval. He asked if the Bureau could separate the response by making available immediately portions of the mail cover lists such as the identities of people who were the targets of mail covers in the domestic field. He again was informed that this was not possible in the absence of proper approval. Mr. Wallach stated that he wanted me to know that he was in possession of a list of Bureau mail covers for the past five years which he had been furnished by a source whom he did not identify. He was asked (1) if this list concerned the mail covers in the national security areas and, (2) was it a national list. Mr. Wallach stated it was a national list in the national security areas. He stated he was not sure of its accuracy. He indicated that he would have no reservations about using the list to conduct the Senate Select Committee business and stated that interviews may be conducted based on the list.

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DATE 10-11-2006 BY SP2/MLP/af

MDP-76

Interviewed on 6-18-75 at Washington, D. C.

File #

by Paul V. Daly <sup>P/D</sup> Date dictated 6-18-75

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

He was advised that the list would contain sensitive information which would seriously impair ongoing Bureau investigations. He replied that the names were not classified, and since they were not classified he would have no problem in using the list. It was explained to Mr. Wallach that despite the fact it was not classified the list would be extremely sensitive since it would impair many ongoing investigations and in many instances the very fact that we are interested in an individual indicates that we are in possession of sensitive information concerning that individual. Mr. Wallach pointed out that if this were the case, acknowledging that he had been informed previously that one of the reasons for the necessity for closely reviewing the material to be made available was because of this problem, then the Bureau should come forward with its own list and point out to him which of the names are sensitive and which are not. Mr. Wallach stated that only one or two other people had knowledge of the fact he possessed such a list.

# Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Phillips took a telephone call this morning from former SA Alan G. Sentinella (has already been interviewed and testified before the SSC) who advised that he had been contacted earlier this morning by Richard Davis. Davis told Sentinella that Epstein had called him 6/25/75 and made an appointment to interview Davis in Atlanta (exact site unknown) 2:00 p.m., Tuesday, 7/8/75. Davis had first tried to reach Charles Haynes, a supervisor in the Atlanta Office, on 6/25/75 and, being unable to do so, decided to pass the information to Sentinella as he knew that Sentinella had had several contacts with FBIHQ in relation to Sentinella's own testimony and Davis requested Sentinella to pass the information to FBIHQ. Davis gave his

REC-102

3 JUL 8 1975

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CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUL 9 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: Senstudy 75  
62-116395

telephone numbers at Atlanta (Code 404) as 294-2786 (office) and 633-1079 (residence). Davis is scheduled to be on vacation the week preceding the interview.

ACTION:

On the basis of the prior FBI release of Davis from his employment agreement for purposes of the interview, Intelligence Division will contact Davis in advance through the Atlanta Office and arrange for Phillips to consult with Davis immediately prior to the interview and be available for consultation purposes at the time of the interview. This is in accordance with the procedure we have been following in connection with interviews of former Bureau personnel.

JAM  
R70

W.R.W.

W.

J.B.K.  
O.P.M.

The Attorney General

June 12, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

1-Mr. J. B. Adams  
1-Mr. H. N. Bassett  
2-Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1-Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1-Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1-Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1-Mr. P. V. Daly

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by Staff Members of captioned Committee of Miss Helen W. Gandy, former Executive Assistant to the Director of the FBI. A copy of this memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - 67- (Personnel File of Helen W. Gandy)

1 - 67- (Personnel File of John P. Mohr)

HM:jvl  
(12)

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DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2KML/PL

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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

MAILED 1975

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

1-Mr. Adams  
1-Mr. Bassett

62-116395

June 12, 1975

**U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)**

2-Mr. Mintz  
(1-Mr. Hotis)  
1-Mr. Wannall  
1-Mr. Cregar  
1-Mr. Daly

**RE: INTERVIEW OF HELEN W. GANDY,  
FORMER EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO  
THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI, BY SSC  
STAFF MEMBERS**

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DATE 10/11/81 BY SP1/ML/ff  
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The following information concerning the interview of Miss Helen W. Gandy by members of the Staff of the SSC in Washington, D. C., on May 15, 1975, was voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Miss Gandy and by Mr. John P. Mohr, former Assistant to the Director of the FBI, who was present during the interview at the request of Miss Gandy.

Miss Gandy was interviewed by Staff Members Mark Gitenstein and Michael Epstein from approximately 10:30 a. m. to 1:00 p. m., and from 2:00 p. m. to 3:00 p. m. Staff Member Martha Talley was also present during the morning session of the interview. Miss Gandy was not placed under oath, and she was not advised of her rights or that she could be represented by personal counsel.

The questioning of Miss Gandy was directed primarily toward obtaining information on procedures and personnel in the office of former Director Hoover, on the floor plan of Mr. Hoover's office suite, on the "Official and Confidential" (OC) files maintained in Mr. Hoover's office, and on the destruction of Mr. Hoover's personal correspondence by Miss Gandy after Mr. Hoover's death.

Miss Gandy said she was asked about the setup of Mr. Hoover's office suite and that the questions showed a special interest in the rear exit of the suite. She explained that this exit was

1 - 67- (Personnel File of Helen W. Gandy)

1 - 67- (Personnel File of John P. Mohr)

HM:jvl  
(12)

ENCLOSURE

SEE NOTE PAGE TEN

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons without the express approval of the FBI.

**U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**

**RE: INTERVIEW OF HELEN W. GANDY**

used by Mr. Hoover since it was most convenient to his private office. Mr. Mohr stated that Mr. Gittenstein had attempted to draw a chart of Mr. Hoover's office. Since that chart was a poor one, Mr. Gittenstein asked Mr. Mohr to draw a rough chart of the office, which Mr. Mohr did. Mr. Mohr recalls that he inadvertently omitted the supply room from the chart; which room, he said, would have been of little or no significance to the questioners since it contained only supplies and no files. Mr. Mohr said concerning the back door to Mr. Hoover's office, that interviewers were informed that persons visiting Mr. Hoover were not brought through this back door, which was for Mr. Hoover's use.

Miss Gandy was asked by Staff Members about the use of the conference room, who attended the conferences, and the purpose of the conferences. She said that Mr. Mohr explained that the Director at these conferences discussed with FBI officials matters regarding FBI administration and policy. She was also asked about the contents of bookcases in the conference room which contained criminal code volumes, ring binders of interesting cases, and miscellaneous books.

Miss Gandy was asked how many file cabinets were in her office. She answered that she could not be positive but she believed there were approximately ten or twelve cabinets of five drawers each. These cabinets were secured with special locks and the key was kept in a special locked key cabinet.

Miss Gandy was asked for the names of other employees in Mr. Hoover's office and she provided the names of Miss Edna Holmes, Mrs. Erma Metcalf, Miss Ruth McCord, Miss Nancy Ann Mooney and Mr. Ronald E. Thompson.

Miss Gandy was asked if the Office Manager, Miss Holmes, had files in her office and she answered, "no." She was asked if the Office Manager's secretary, Miss McCord, had files in her office and she answered that Miss McCord did have those files necessary to her supervision of office personnel and maintenance. She also explained the function of the office receptionist.

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**RE: INTERVIEW OF HELEN W. GANDY**

Miss Gandy was asked whether files were kept in the Telephone Room and answered that the only files kept there were background material necessary to the functioning of that office. She was asked if a record was kept of telephone calls and visitors to the Director. She replied that a daily log was maintained, and that these logs were permanently filed in the main Bureau files.

Miss Gandy was asked if files were kept in the office of the mail clerk, Miss Mooney. She answered "yes," and described these files as mainly photograph files and scrapbooks.

Concerning the mail in Mr. Hoover's office, Mr. Mohr said Mr. Gitenstein raised a question about "Expedite Processing" of mail, to which Miss Gandy replied that the personal and confidential mail for Mr. Hoover was handled by Miss Mooney and that she, Miss Gandy, was not aware of just how this mail was handled. Mr. Mohr said he explained to the questioners that this mail was received in the Routing Unit of the Records and Communications Division and was taken unopened to Miss Mooney, who opened it. The clerical employee who brought the mail then logged it and stamped "Expedite Processing" on the left-hand edge. Then, the clerical employee would take the log back to the Routing Unit and when the mail was subsequently returned to the Routing Unit for regular filing purposes, the item would be crossed off the log. Mr. Mohr said Mr. Gitenstein wanted to know if the "Expedite Processing" logs were maintained permanently and Mr. Mohr answered that to his knowledge the logs were not kept after the items on a particular log had been accounted for.

Mr. Mohr said that Miss Gandy was asked about procedures regarding Mr. Hoover's commitments and she explained that each morning the employees in the Telephone Room prepared a "commitment card" of Mr. Hoover's commitments for the day and this card was placed on Mr. Hoover's desk the first thing in the morning

**U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**

**RE: INTERVIEW OF HELEN W. GANDY**

for his information. Miss Gandy told the questioners that she received a copy of the commitment card and that these cards were not retained permanently. Mr. Mohr said that it was explained to the interviewers that the Bureau had an instruction that items of a temporary nature were to be destroyed after they were 90 days old and Miss Gandy indicated to the interviewers that commitment cards were in this category. Mr. Mohr said Miss Gandy was queried at length as to just how Telephone Room employees got their information to make up the commitment card and she explained that all employees in Mr. Hoover's office made certain the Telephone Room employees were promptly advised of all Mr. Hoover's commitments as they were made.

Further, concerning the Telephone Room, Mr. Mohr said the interviewers were informed that calls for Mr. Hoover were received in the Bureau switchboard and were then referred to the Telephone Room in Mr. Hoover's office. The employees in the Telephone Room connected Mr. Hoover with the calls. Mr. Mohr said the interviewers asked whether the Telephone Room "screened" Mr. Hoover's calls and that they were informed that the Telephone Room did not "screen" them except for "nut" calls.

Miss Gandy said she informed interviewers, in response to questions, that she did receive calls from persons wishing to speak with Mr. Hoover and if he was in his office, the calls would be transferred to his Telephone Room. She said Mr. Gitenstein made a remark about a special telephone connection between Mr. Hoover and former Attorney General Robert Kennedy and also remarked that Mr. Hoover and former Attorney General John Mitchell also had a special telephone connection. Miss Gandy said she corrected Mr. Gitenstein immediately by informing him that no special telephone connection existed with any Attorney General except Attorney General Kennedy.

Concerning the OC files maintained in Mr. Hoover's office suite, Miss Gandy said she informed the interviewers that these files were kept in a locked file cabinet and occupied about one and

**U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**

**RE: INTERVIEW OF HELEN W. GANDY**

one half or two file drawers. In answer to questions from the interviewers, Miss Gandy said she informed them that on the day of Mr. Hoover's death she spoke with Mr. Clyde Tolson, who was then Acting Director of the FBI, and with Mr. Mohr and asked to whom she should deliver the OC files and other Bureau material contained in Mr. Hoover's office.

Mr. Tolson instructed that the OC files and all other Bureau material such as interesting cases, monographs and manuals be delivered to Mr. Mark Felt who then was Assistant Director-Deputy Associate Director of the FBI. Miss Gandy said she was exhaustively questioned by Mr. Epstein as to whether she called Mr. Tolson or he called her and concerning Mr. Tolson's location at the time. Miss Gandy said she told Mr. Epstein that at this late date she had no idea who called whom but Mr. Epstein was assured that she and Mr. Tolson communicated. She was also asked when Mr. Tolson arrived at Mr. Hoover's house on the morning of Mr. Hoover's death. She answered that Mr. Tolson arrived there soon after Mr. Hoover's body was discovered. Miss Gandy said she asked the interviewers if they desired more details of that morning and was told that they did not.

Miss Gandy said she told the interviewers that Mr. Tolson's instructions were carried out. The OC files and the index cards pertaining to them and the other Bureau material mentioned above were placed in cartons and delivered to Mr. Felt. She was asked who delivered the cartons to Mr. Felt's office and answered that she believed that the delivery was handled by messengers or maintenance personnel, but indicated she was not certain about this.

Miss Gandy said she told the interviewers that as soon as Mr. L. Patrick Gray III was named to head the FBI, Mr. Felt brought him to the Director's office to afford him an idea of the office setup. After Mr. Gray indicated a very special interest in the files in her office, the contents of these files were explained to him and he

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**RE: INTERVIEW OF HELEN W. GANDY**

was invited to view the contents. Mr. Gray did glance through a drawer and obviously was satisfied that they contained personal correspondence only and was also satisfied that the Bureau material had been delivered to Mr. Felt.

Miss Gandy said one of the interviewers remarked that there appeared to be more OC files than had been indicated and that a larger number had been given to Attorney General Levi. She responded that she would not know whether other files had been added to the group after they had been delivered to Mr. Felt. Mr. Gitenstein, she said, attempted to show her a pamphlet apparently containing testimony of the Attorney General which described certain of the files in question. Mr. Gitenstein asked her about specific cases in the OC files and she told him that after three years she would not presume to try to remember specifics. Mr. Gitenstein asked if there was a file containing reports from the Washington Field Office. She told him that she certainly would not remember such a file, if one existed.

Miss Gandy said there was much questioning about the index cards which pertained to the OC files. She told the interviewers that they were filed in one index file, that cards of a different color were used and that this index file was locked.

Miss Gandy said she told the interviewers that strictly personal correspondence of Mr. Hoover had been contained in the file cabinets in her office and that from time to time during the past fifty years, files which were no longer current were eliminated. Concerning the destruction of Mr. Hoover's personal correspondence, she told interviewers that on the day of Mr. Hoover's death, she advised Mr. Tolson of Mr. Hoover's expressed instruction that his personal correspondence be destroyed, that Mr. Hoover had begun a review of these personal files sometime prior to his death and that some of them had been already destroyed.

**U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**

**RE: INTERVIEW OF HELEN W. GANDY**

Miss Gandy said she told the interviewers that up until the time she left the Bureau, she continued to tear up the contents of Mr. Hoover's personal correspondence files and deposited the contents of the files in the "confidential trash" waste baskets. Mr. Mohr said Mr. Epstein wanted to know if a log was maintained of items placed in the confidential trash baskets for destruction. Mr. Mohr informed Mr. Epstein that it would be ridiculous to think that such a log could be maintained and Mr. Mohr advised him exactly how confidential trash is destroyed in the Bureau. Mr. Mohr said he informed Mr. Epstein of the Bureau files that were scattered over the streets of Southwest Washington as a result of the Department of Justice engaging in destruction of some of its files. Mr. Mohr said this reference permitted an immediate termination of any questions regarding the destruction of confidential trash.

Miss Gandy said she told interviewers she asked Mr. Gray if, in order to vacate the office as soon as possible for his convenience, she could have his approval to send to Mr. Hoover's house the personal correspondence files which could not be disposed of before the date of her retirement, so that she could finish the task there. Mr. Gray did not hesitate to give her this permission. Mr. Felt, who was present when she spoke with Mr. Gray in her office, suggested that a locked room, on the fifth floor, with a key only she would have, could be made available so the files could be disposed of without moving. Miss Gandy said that would not be necessary and Mr. Gray agreed. At this point Mr. Gitenstein asked Miss Gandy if she thought she might not be the only one with a key. Miss Gandy asked Mr. Gitenstein what he would have thought and she said Mr. Gitenstein smiled and said he would have thought that.

Miss Gandy said that at a point in the interview when the questioning appeared to be getting pretty far afield, she said to the interviewers that if they were trying to learn whether the OC files contained anything that would be used for political purposes, the answer was no and that she had never found the need to lie about anything.

**U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**

**RE: INTERVIEW OF HELEN W. GANDY**

Mr. Mohr said that Miss Gandy, when she was describing to the interviewers exactly how Mr. Hoover's personal correspondence files were destroyed, said she reviewed each item that she handled to make sure that it was not related to Bureau official business. Mr. Mohr said Miss Gandy had previously indicated that Mrs. Erma Metcalf had assisted her in destroying these files, but Miss Gandy did not mention that Mrs. Metcalf made the same type of review and Miss Gandy was not questioned regarding whether Mrs. Metcalf made such a review as she went through the files and helped destroy them.

Mr. Mohr said that during the interview a rather heated conversation occurred over some of the questions which seemed to be repetitious and irrelevant. Mr. Mohr said he told Mr. Gitenstein he felt it was high time the questioners quit "beating around the bush" and come to the point by asking Miss Gandy if she ever destroyed any official and confidential files. Mr. Gitenstein replied that they had a discrepancy concerning the OC files in that a reliable source had reported that Mr. Mark Felt had five two-drawer cabinets marked "O and C Files" in his office. Miss Gandy on the other hand told Mr. Gitenstein in response to a question that she had turned over to Mr. Felt after Mr. Hoover's death, as she recollected, one and one half drawers and possibly two drawers of OC files. Mr. Mohr said he explained to Mr. Gitenstein that Miss Gandy would have no way of knowing what files Mr. Felt had in his office and if there was a discrepancy, the person to resolve it was Mr. Felt, who Mr. Gitenstein had said had been interviewed by him and had been cooperative.

Mr. Mohr said he had previously explained to Mr. Gitenstein, in response to questions at the time Mr. Mohr was interviewed by Staff Members, that at the time Mr. William C. Sullivan had furnished the data of 17 White House telephone tapes to Mr. Mardian in the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice, Mr. Hoover had instructed that any Assistant Director or Bureau

**U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**

**RE: INTERVIEW OF HELEN W. GANDY**

official who had files in his office that he considered confidential and relating to the Bureau's work would immediately transfer such files to Mr. Felt and prepare a memorandum stating exactly what was transferred to Mr. Felt. Mr. Mohr said he told Mr. Gitzenstein he, Mr. Mohr, had no idea how many files Mr. Felt collected as a result of Mr. Hoover's instruction. Mr. Mohr said it was interesting to note that he was not asked at any time whether he had turned over any files to Mr. Felt in connection with Mr. Hoover's instructions.

Mr. Mohr stated that Miss Gandy was asked during her interview whether there were any files of Mr. Hoover's personal correspondence in Mr. Hoover's former home at the present time and Miss Gandy replied, "no."

Mr. Mohr said Mr. Epstein questioned Miss Gandy at length concerning her title as "Executive Assistant." Mr. Epstein wanted to know when she acquired this title and she said she could not recall. Mr. Epstein asked whether anyone else at the FBI had occupied this position and Miss Gandy explained that she was the only employee with the title of Executive Assistant who had served under Mr. Hoover during his tenure in office. Mr. Epstein seemed to pay a great deal of attention to the title Executive Assistant and Mr. Mohr attempted to explain to him that the title was a Civil Service Commission (CSC) title and that Miss Gandy's position was set up under the Classification Act administered by the CSC. Mr. Mohr said he was not sure what was behind Mr. Epstein's lengthy questioning about this title, but Mr. Mohr got the impression that Mr. Epstein may have been trying to find out if Miss Gandy acted for Mr. Hoover on her own initiative. Mr. Mohr said this was just a guess on his part.

Miss Gandy said that at one point during the interview, the questions concerned Mr. Hoover's being advised of Bureau matters. She said the interviewers were told by her and by Mr. Mohr that Mr. Hoover was never out of touch with the Bureau, day or night, whether he was in town or out of town.

**U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**

**RE: INTERVIEW OF HELEN W. GANDY**

**NOTE:**

The original and one copy of this LHM is being furnished to the Attorney General. The copy is to be forwarded by the Attorney General to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. Information in this LHM was taken from notes supplied by Mr. John P. Mohr and Miss Helen Gandy. These notes are attached to the file copy of this LHM.



- 1a = drew a chart of Mr. H's office - identified people and things in cage room
1. Expedite processing = how handled?
2. Executive Assistant = ?
3. I.C. Files were maintained in big Comp Rm in "black" folders. didn't mention supply prin. = oversight.
4. Destruction of Per Com files = Miss L. said she reviewed each item to make sure none related to Ba. Of. Bus.
5. Miss Bandy explained a log was kept of all visitors seen by Mr. H. = also log was kept of telephone calls taken by Mr. H.
6. Asked re. Mr. H's commitments = who prepared + were they retained = us.
7. All calls to Mr. H. came thru the Director's phone room.
8. Re. O.C. File = reliable source told them Felt had 5-2 drawer cabinets marked a c files - discrepancy? why not ask Felt. Also re. Files we had to

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DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP4M/AR  
mjb/v



9. Are there any files - pers & comm.  
in Hoover's former home cross =  
Miss Gandy - no.
10. Re. Confidential trash = Epstein  
wants to know if log was  
kept - nice man.
11. Re back door - who used - any  
files in hallway - no.

Mr. Mohr.

I didn't mention the questions  
re expedite processing nor  
the close questioning re the  
Ex-Assistant title. You explained  
those items.

Hope I remembered enough

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DATE 10-11-2008 BY SP1A/m/hp

MDR-16

May 15, 1975

Present at questioning - Mark Gitenstein  
Mike Epstein  
✓ Martha Talley (morning session only)  
John P. Mohr  
Helen W. Gandy

The first questions concerned the set-up of the Director's office suite. Special interest was indicated in the rear exit of the suite and it was explained that this exit was used by the Director as it was most convenient to his private office. Mr. Mohr also mentioned the kitchen and lavatory, as the questioners appeared to be completely unfamiliar with the arrangement of the suite.

Next, the conference room was described and in answer to questions the use of the conference room was explained - also, information was given re the contents of the bookcases in this room, ie, miscellaneous books; the Criminal Code volumes; the ring binders of Interesting Cases.

Numerous questions were asked:

How often did the Director call conferences of the officials of the Bureau -

what were the purposes of these conferences -  
just who attended them -

were they called by the Director - and was this at set and regular intervals.

Mr. Mohr explained that the Director from time to time, as he reviewed matters of policy and like matters that came to his attention, made notes which he discussed with the officials, giving them his ideas on these matters and in turn listening to their views. These sessions considered ~~xxxx~~ all matters re Bureau administration and policy.

Three; The physical set-up of the office of the Executive Assistant:

I was asked re the number of file cases in my office - I answered that I could not, at this date, be positive, but I believe there were approximately ten or twelve five-drawer cabinets -

What were the contents of these cabinets and where were the so-called o.c. files - were the o.c. files contained in combination locked cabinets -

I answered that all of the cabinets in my office were secured with special locks and key, and that the key was kept in a special locked key-cabinet in this office.

Questions-did I receive calls for the Director from his friends and others, and did I transfer them to his desk; did I make memoranda of such calls; did I keep a diary; (Mr. Gitenstein made a remark re a special telephone connection between the Director and "Bobby", apparently thought better of it, and remarked that Mr. Mitchell had such a connection)

ENCLOSURE

He was immediately corrected by me to the effect that no such connection existed with Attorneys General other than Attorney General Kennedy.

I answered that I did receive calls from persons wishing to speak with the Director; that, if he were in his office, such calls would be transferred to the Director's Office telephone room to be connected with the Director if he should be in his office and could take the call. (Here Mr. Mohr explained in detail the system of handling telephone calls in the Director's office and the functions of the FBI telephone switchboard.)

It was explained that the file cabinets in my office contained strictly personal correspondence of the Director; that from time to time during the past fifty years files which were no longer current were eliminated.

Re the so-called o.c. files - it was explained that these files were located in one of the locked cabinets; that there were, possibly one and a half or two file drawers of these. In answer to questioning it was explained that on the day of Mr. Hoover's death I spoke with both Mr. Tolson, who at that time was Acting Director, and Mr. Mohr, and asked for instructions as to whom I should deliver the official-confidential files and other Bureau material contained in the Director's offices. I also advised Mr. Tolson of Mr. Hoover's expressed instructions that his personal correspondence be destroyed, and that he, Mr. Hoover, had begun a review of these personal files sometime previous to his death, and some already had been destroyed. Mr. Tolson instructed that the official-confidential files and all other Bureau material, ie, Interesting Cases; monographs, Manuals, be delivered to Mr. Mark Felt. (Here, I was asked where the Bureau material was kept and answered that book-cases in my office were used for this purpose.

I was exhaustively questioned by Mr. Epstein as to whether I called Mr. Tolson (and where he was located at the time) or whether Mr. Tolson called me. I told him that at this late date I had no idea as to who called whom, but that he was assured that Mr. Tolson and I communicated. I also was asked when Mr. Tolson arrived at Mr. Hoover's house on the morning in question and was told Mr. Tolson arrived after Mr. Hoover's body was discovered. (I asked if more details of that morning were desired and was told no.)

I explained that instructions were immediately carried out; the o.c. files, with the index cards pertaining to them, together with the above mentioned Bureau material, was placed in cartons and delivered to Mr. Felt. I was asked who carried these cartons to Mr. Felt's office and said I could not at this date answer this but I believe they would have been carried by either messengers or maintenance personnel.

\*There was quite much questioning here as to how and where the index cards were filed. It was explained that they were filed in the one index file, cards of a different color being used, and that this file also was locked.

3.

In connection with the above authorizations it was explained that as soon as Mr. Gray was named as the new Director Mr. Felt brought him to the Director's office to afford him an idea of the office set-up; that Mr. Gray indicated a very special interest in the files in my office; that their contents were explained to him and that he was invited to view the contents. He did glance thru a drawer and obviously was satisfied that they contained personal correspondence only, and was also satisfied that the Bureau material had been delivered to Mr. Felt. One of the questioners remarked that there appeared to be more o.c. files than had been indicated; that a larger number had been given to Attorney General Levi...I remarked that I would not know whether other files had been added to the group after they had been delivered to Mr. Felt. Mr. Gitenstein then attempted to show me a pamphlet indicating what appeared to be testimony of the Attorney General describing certain of the files in question and asked questions re specific cases which were contained in the o.c. files. I told him I would not presume, after three years, to try to remember specifics. He asked if there were a file containing reports from the Washington Field Office. I told him certainly I would not remember such a file, if one existed.

To questions regarding the destruction of personal correspondence files I explained that up until the time I left the Bureau I continued to tear up and deposit the contents of these files in the "confidential trash" waste baskets; (Mr. Mohr here explained this method of disposal.) that I had asked Mr. Gray if, in order to vacate the office as soon as possible for his convenience, I could have his approval to send to Mr. Hoover's house files which could not be disposed of before my date of retirement and finish the task there. He did not hesitate to give me this permission. (Mr. Felt, who was present when I spoke with Mr. Gray (in my office) suggested that a locked room on the fifth floor, with a key only I would have, could be made available so the files would be disposed of without moving. I said that would not be necessary and Mr. Gray agreed. At this point Mr. Gitenstein asked me if I thought I might not be the only one with a key. I asked him what he would have thought and he smiled and said he would have thought that.

Four: Questions were asked, in further connection with the set-up of the office and personnel.

The office of the Office Manager (Miss Holmes). Did she have file cases in her office. The answer was "no".

The office of the secretary to the Office Manager (Miss McCord) Were there files in her office and if so what did they contain. The answer was "yes" and the contents were material necessary for use by the Office Manager in connection with her supervision of the office personnel, ~~and maintaining the~~ and maintainance.

The reception room. The function of the receptionist was explained.

4.

✓ The telephone room. Here, again, close questioning re files kept in this office. Assurance was given that the only files kept here were background material necessary to the functioning of the office. Questions were asked if records were made of telephone calls and visitors to the Director. Information was given that a daily log was maintained, and it was described. Question was asked re where and how long the logs were maintained. Answer was that they were permanently filed in the main Bureau files. Mail clerk's (Miss Mooney) office. Were there files here? Answer was yes, mainly photograph files and also the scrap books.

✓ The names of Miss Holmes - Mrs. Metcalf - Miss McCord - Ron Thompson and Miss Mooney were requested and given.

✓ At one point during the sessions in being questioned re the Director's being advised of Bureau matters the questioners were told by both Mr. Mohr and me that Mr. Hoover never was out of touch with the Bureau, day or night, whether in town or out of town.

✓ Also, I said at a point when the questioning appeared to be getting pretty far afield, if what they were trying to learn was whether there was contained in the o.c. files anything that would be used for political purpose, the answer was NO - that I had never found the need to lie about anything.

5/23/75

RE: MISS GANDY'S QUESTIONING BY SENATE  
SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING  
FEDERAL AGENCIES WITH INTELLIGENCE-  
GATHERING FUNCTIONS

Miss Gandy and I appeared before the staff of the subcommittee for questioning on May 15, 1975, our appointment being set for 10:30 a.m. The group consisting of Messrs. Gitenstein, Epstein and M. S. Talley immediately proceeded to the former Carroll Arms Apartment building which is now used as an office building by the U.S. Senate. We were taken to the sixth floor where we entered an empty office which contained telephone equipment, some chairs, and a desk.

Mr. Gitenstein had apparently drawn up a list of questions he wished to discuss with Miss Gandy and he referred to this list throughout the questioning period.

There is attached a rough draft memorandum consisting of four pages and dated May 15, 1975, which was prepared by Miss Gandy concerning her recollection of what transpired during the interview. The interview, incidentally, lasted until 1 p.m. when a one-hour break was taken for lunch. The session reconvened at 2 p.m. and was terminated at 3 p.m.

I am setting forth hereafter in numbered paragraphs items which I recollect transpired during the interview which should be helpful in embellishing Miss Gandy's memorandum.

(1) During the early part of the questioning, Mr. Gitenstein attempted to draw a chart of Mr. Hoover's office in the Department of Justice building. He said he had previously visited Mr. Kelley's suite in the Justice Building. His effort at charting the office was poor at best and he requested my assistance. A rough chart was drawn showing Mr. Hoover's personal office on one end and Miss Mooney's office on the other end. In making up the chart I inadvertently left out the supply room which, of course, would have been of little or no significance to the questioners since this room contained supplies only and no files.

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62-116395-218  
ENCLOSURE

(2) Sometime during the interview, Mr. Gitenstein raised a question about "Expedite Processing" of mail and how it was handled in Mr. Hoover's office. Miss Gandy pointed out that the handling of personal and confidential mail for Mr. Hoover was handled by Miss Mooney and she, Miss Gandy, was not aware of just how this mail was handled. I explained that all <sup>personal and confidential</sup> mail received in the Routing Unit of the Records and Communications Division was taken unopened to Miss Mooney in Mr. Hoover's office where she opened this mail and the clerical employee who brought the mail down then logged it in and stamped the mail "Expedite Processing" on the left-hand edge. Thereafter the clerical employee would take the log back to the Routing Unit and when the mail was subsequently returned to the Routing Unit for regular filing purposes the item would be crossed off the log. Mr. Gitenstein wanted to know if the "Expedite Processing" logs were maintained permanently and he was informed that to my knowledge they were not kept after accounting for the particular items of mail contained on the particular log.

(3) Mr. Epstein questioned Miss Gandy at length concerning her title as "Executive Assistant." He wanted to know when she acquired this title and she said she could not recall. He wanted to know whether anyone else at the FBI had occupied this position and Miss Gandy explained that she was the only employee with the title of Executive Assistant who had served under Mr. Hoover during his tenure in office. Mr. Epstein seemed to pay a great deal of attention to the title Executive Assistant and I endeavored to explain to him that the title was a Civil Service Commission title and that Miss Gandy's position was set up under the Classification Act administered by the Civil Service Commission. Although I am not sure what was behind Mr. Epstein's lengthy questioning about this matter, I got the impression he might be trying to find out if Miss Gandy acted for Mr. Hoover on her own initiative. This is just a guess on my part and I am not sure what was behind his questioning.

(4) During Miss Gandy's description of the various offices, she did mention specifically the fact that the interesting case files were maintained on the shelves in the big conference room in black folders. They asked what the interesting case files consisted of and I explained this to their satisfaction; namely, that they were writeups of closed cases which might be of interest for various purposes.

✓ (5) I should mention that Miss Gandy in describing exactly how Mr. Hoover's personal correspondence files were destroyed said she reviewed each item that she handled to make sure that it was not related to Bureau official business. She had previously indicated that Mrs. Erma Metcalf had assisted her in destroying these files but she did not mention that Mrs. Metcalf indulged in the same type of review and Miss Gandy was not questioned whether Mrs. Metcalf had made such a review as she went through the files and helped destroy them.

✓ (6) Both Mr. Gitenstein and Mr. Epstein queried Miss Gandy at length about the log kept in the Telephone Room of all calls taken by Mr. Hoover. They also queried her at length concerning a log that was kept in the Telephone Room of all visitors to FBI Headquarters who were seen by Mr. Hoover. Miss Gandy explained that these logs, to her knowledge, were currently retained in the regular Bureau file room.

✓ (7) Miss Gandy was asked regarding Mr. Hoover's commitments and she explained that each morning the employees in the Telephone Room prepared a commitment card of Mr. Hoover's commitments for the day and this card was placed on Mr. Hoover's desk the first thing in the morning for his information. Miss Gandy reported that she received a copy of this commitment card. She was asked whether these commitment cards were retained permanently and she replied in the negative. Somewhere along the line it was explained to the interviewers that the Bureau had an instruction that all items of a temporary nature, such as ticklers and the like were to be destroyed after they were 90 days old. Miss Gandy indicated these commitment cards would have come under this category for destruction. Miss Gandy was queried at length as to just how the Telephone Room employees got their information to make up the commitment card and she explained that all employees in Mr. Hoover's office made certain the Telephone Room employees were promptly advised of all of Mr. Hoover's commitments as they were made.

✓ (8) In explaining the telephone set-up in the Department of Justice building as far as it related to the FBI, the Staff members were informed that calls for Mr. Hoover were received in the Bureau's switchboard and were then referred to the Telephone Room in Mr. Hoover's office and the employees in the Telephone Room handled the problem of connecting Mr. Hoover with the caller. They wanted to know whether employees in the Telephone Room screened Mr. Hoover's telephone calls and they were informed Telephone Room employees did not screen them except for "nut" calls.

✓ (9) During a rather heated conversation in the afternoon about some of the questioning being done which seemed to be repetitious and

irrelevant, Mr. Gitenstein was told by me that I felt it was high time the questioners quit "beating around the bush" and came to the point by asking Miss Gandy if she had ever destroyed any official and confidential files. Mr. Gitenstein replied they had a discrepancy concerning the O and C files in that a reliable source had reported that Mr. Mark Felt had five two-drawer cabinets marked "O and C Files" in his office. Miss Gandy on the other hand told Mr. Gitenstein in response to a question that she had turned over to Mr. Felt after Mr. Hoover's death, as she recollected, one and one-half drawers and possibly two drawers of O and C files. I explained to Mr. Gitenstein that Miss Gandy would have no way of knowing what files Mr. Felt had in his office and if there was a discrepancy the person to resolve the discrepancy was Mr. Felt who Mr. Gitenstein had told me previously had been interviewed by him and had been cooperative. I had previously explained to Mr. Gitenstein in response to questions he asked me when I appeared before the Staff that at the time Mr. William C. Sullivan had furnished the data of the 17 White House telephone taps to Mr. Mardian in the Internal Security Division of the Department that Mr. Hoover had instructed that any Assistant Director or Bureau official who had any files in his office he considered to be confidential and relating to the Bureau's work were to be immediately transferred to Mr. Felt and a memorandum prepared concerning exactly what was transferred to Mr. Felt. I told Mr. Gitenstein I had no idea how many files Mr. Felt collected as a result of Mr. Hoover's instructions. It is interesting to note that I was not asked at any time whether I had turned over any files to Mr. Felt in connection with Mr. Hoover's instructions.

(10) Miss Gandy was asked whether there were any files of Mr. Hoover's personal correspondence in Mr. Hoover's former home at the present time. Miss Gandy replied no.

(11) At some point during the interview a reference was made to the confidential trash baskets maintained in the Bureau, to wit, the trash baskets with the painted rim on top. Mr. Epstein wanted to know if a log was maintained of items placed in the confidential trash baskets for destruction. I informed him it would be ridiculous to think that such a log could be maintained and he was advised exactly how confidential trash is destroyed in the Bureau. He was also informed of the Bureau files that were scattered over the streets of Southwest Washington as a result of the Department of Justice engaging in destruction of some of their files. This reference permitted an immediate termination of any questions along the lines of the destruction of confidential trash.

(12) Miss Gandy refers to the fact that questions were raised concerning Mr. Hoover's back door entrance. The questions concerning this back door were to determine just who used this back door entrance and its purpose. In addition to explaining it was immediately adjacent to the elevators at 9th and Pennsylvania Avenue which Mr. Hoover used to enter and exit the building, they were also advised that this was Mr. Hoover's private and personal entrance and that persons wishing to see Mr. Hoover were not brought through this back door.

The foregoing is submitted for information purposes and as an auxiliary record of Miss Gandy's appearance before the Staff of the Senate Select Committee on May 15, 1975, accompanied by me, John P. Mohr.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index				FROM: <b>Federal Bureau of Investigation</b>			
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees							
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)						2. DATE PROVIDED <b>6/12/74</b>	
DOCUMENT	BRIEFING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X	INTERVIEW	TESTIMONY	OTHER		
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)							
SSC	Memorandum containing results of interview provided to Attorney General and to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.						
HSC							
4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)							
Miss Helen W. Gandy, former Executive Assistant to the Director of the FBI.							
5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)						6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)	
(NOT APPLICABLE)						"U"	
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)							
Management Operating Procedures				ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2ALM/247 MDP-16			
8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)							
Miss Gandy was questioned by Staff Members of SSC concerning the organizational and operational procedures followed in former Director Hoover's office, as well as maintenance of and disposition of the files of the former Director marked "Official and Confidential."							
TREAT AS YELLOW							
TJM:1hb (4) 62-116395		ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. <b>6-24-75 LFS</b>					

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6/10/75

FROM/ : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

on Intelligence

# Activities

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

On 6/9/75, Mr. K. William O'Connor advised me that the Senate Select Committee would like to obtain access to Appendices A through E of the original Petersen Committee report on COINTELPRO. He advised that the Deputy Attorney General had requested him to determine by the morning of 6/10/75 whether the FBI would object to disclosing the Appendices to the Committee. Subsequently, Mr. O'Connor sent me a copy of a note he addressed to the Deputy Attorney General dated 6/9/75, and its enclosure (a copy of a letter from Senator Church to the Attorney General dated 6/9/75), both of which pertain to the Senate Select Committee request to have access to Appendices A through E of the Petersen report. The letter also requests access to Appendices K and L for inspection by designated Committee staff at the Department of Justice. (Copies of these two are attached).

Previously, the Intelligence Division has been requested to review Appendices A through E which are summaries of the several CONINTELPRO programs. This memorandum should be referred to the Intelligence Division to indicate the need to expedite that review and to furnish appropriate recommendations to the Director concerning any objections the FBI should have to disclosure of the Appendices requested. In view of the urgency of the information furnished by Mr. O'Connor it is suggested that this memorandum serve as the authority for the disclosing of the requested Appendices in the absence of any strong objections by the Intelligence Division.

## RECOMMENDATION:

Legal Counsel Division ~~167-111-2-1975~~ advised Mr. O'Connor on the morning of 6/10/75, that the FBI will defer to the judgment of the Deputy Attorney General in regard to disclosure of Appendices A through E of the Petersen report and of limited access to Appendices K and L by designated staff representatives.

- 1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Gregar  
1 - Mr. Hotis  
1 - Mr. Daly

SEE ADDENDUM: INTD - PAGE 2

NW 88326 DocId:32989611 Page 127

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116009-7X

ADDENDUM: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

6/10/75 ABF:glw

Intelligence Division strongly feels Exhibits A through E should not be made available. These constitute work papers prepared on an expedite basis by Special Agents operating under the understanding their effort was of a rough draft nature which would be utilized by a committee of the Justice Department and FBI for an in-house investigation. The Agents preparing the documents never conceived that their effort would be subject to review outside of the Department and particularly outside the Executive Branch.

By letter dated 4/21/75 to the Attorney General it was pointed out these exhibits related to the internal deliberations of the Department and FBI representatives, some of the material in these summaries is classified and relates to sensitive operations and they should not be revealed. Also, Deputy Attorney General Lawrence Silberman in testimony before the Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee (Edwards Committee) on 11/20/74 indicated as regards these documents, "If we had thought it was appropriate to release the full discussion we would have done so at the time. There are a lot of internal working documents which go into the making of a final report."

Further, if these documents are released to the SSC, or if the Committee is allowed access to them, we would not then be in a position to deny access to them by the Edwards Committee or the House Select Committee on Intelligence (Nedzi). Should they be released and come within the public domain, we could then be in a position of violating individual rights of privacy and compromising sensitive investigative techniques and Bureau sources. We feel we should first go through these work papers and excise such items to avoid any such complication.

INTD recommends Legal Counsel advise Mr. O'Connor we strongly object to the release of the above Exhibits to the SSC. However, we recognize our objection may be overruled by the Attorney General; and if so, we would request we have an opportunity to make the excisions noted above prior to the Department turning the Exhibits over to the SSC.

Done:  
6/11/75.  
O'Connor  
suggested  
excised material  
be prepared  
on expedite  
I so advised

basis.  
Dave Ryan 6/11/75  
[Signature]

June 9, 1975

TO: Harold R. Tyler, Jr.  
Deputy Attorney General

FROM: Bill O'Connor

This letter follows up the dialogue described in my memo of June 5; Mr. Mintz advised me on June 9, that the Bureau would respond promptly with its views. I am supplying Mr. Mintz a copy of this letter for his file.

cc: ✓ Mr. Mintz

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DATE 10-16-2000 BY SP2/HCM/pmp

MDR-16

Enclosure

62-116395-

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN  
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FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL  
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 9, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi  
Attorney General  
Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Thank you for your letters of May 17 and May 23, 1975, informing the Select Committee of five additional COINTELPRO-type operations disclosed by the continuing FBI review of its counterintelligence files. The Committee appreciates your candor in disclosing the sensitive aspects of these programs. Pursuant to its rules, the Committee will handle this information with the necessary security.

I have been informed that a member of the Committee staff has inspected and taken notes on the 39-page report of the Petersen committee on COINTELPRO. I believe that our security arrangements are more than sufficient to safeguard the confidentiality of its contents. The Committee members themselves as well as the staff would be inconvenienced by its availability in our secure facilities.

I believe that it is vitally important for the Committee to be provided with Appendices A through E of that report. These documents will also be handled according to our stringent security arrangements. In addition, Appendices K and L should be made available for inspection by designated Committee staff at the Department of Justice. I understand that these appendices are not "raw files" of the FBI.

*FBI*  
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DATE 10-16-2010 BY SPCALM/JP  
*MDR-16*

62-116325-

Enclosure

FRANK CHURCH  
FREDERICK A. SCHWARTZ  
CUTTING


The Honorable Edward H. Levi  
Page Two

June 9, 1975

These requests do not preclude the Committee from further pursuing its original request for COINTELPRO materials.

Finally, I cannot emphasize too much the importance to the Select Committee's work of fully understanding COINTELPRO matters. In this regard, I wish to thank you again for calling the new materials, which we will follow up in due course, to our attention.

Sincerely,



Frank Church  
Chairman

JUN 5 1975

Page 1

TO: Harold R. Tyler, Jr.  
Deputy Attorney General

FROM: K. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-16-2000 BY SP2A/MP

SUBJECT: COINTELPRO/Petersen Report

On June 4, 1975, Mr. Elliff of SSC reviewed the 39-page Petersen Report. Afterwards, he had a conference with me from 4:15 to 4:45. The conference resulted in a modification of the previous request. I told him I would be back in touch with him at an appropriate time. He also indicated a probable future course of action by the Committee.

The modification is as follows:

As to Appendices A-E (the summaries prepared by the FBI of certain COINTELPRO operations) Committee staff access is requested. Mr. Elliff advised that he understood that the FBI raw files question was most sensitive, and that he would propose to have staff of the Committee review these Exhibits, and, if the information in these Exhibits was not sufficient for their purposes, to then request an expanded summary of any particular topic summarized, without reaching the issue of access to the Bureau's "raw files".

As to F-J-Staff Assessments - he feels these are not of pressing present importance.

As to K-L (summary reports on espionage matters), he would like personal access; he does not view this as important as A-E above.

As to M & N (Criminal Division legal memoranda), these are not of immediate interest.

cc: Maroney  
✓ Daly

62-114395-

Enclosure

62-116009  
5-AR

memo Wannall  
to O'Connell  
DR:pld 6/10/75-

As to O-FBI public statement - no interest.

As to P (the overall FBI recommendation), he would like personal access.

I discussed as an alternative, access to the initiating documents in the COINTELPRO matters; and that I would attempt to obtain those as an alternative solution to his inquiry. He said that he might be interested in those documents, but they were far less important to him than access to A-E. He reiterated his sensitivity to the question of raw files, and indicated a strong inclination to avoid the raw files question, proceeding by the proposed expanded summaries route if necessary, with expanded summaries to be prepared only in the event of specific questions being raised after staff access to A-E.

He then went on to state that he perceived a significance in the recommendation and proposals of the Petersen Report; and that he felt FBI and DOJ policies might be perceived as at loggerheads, although this was muted in the prose. He said that he felt sure that, at an appropriate time, the Committee would wish to explore, by AG testimony at SSC, the actions of the DOJ on the recommendation reflected in the report. I said that I understood his interest in that process.

My recommendation is that, in view of the retrenchment regarding "raw files", A-E be made available, under the conditions outlined above; I am furnishing a copy of this memorandum to Mr. Daly for dissemination to appropriate Executives of the Bureau, and to Mr. Maroney of the Criminal Division.

I believe a prompt decision as to A-E would be most helpful.

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland
- 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
- (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

The Attorney General

June 19, 1975

Director, FBI

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)  
BUREAU FILE 62-116464

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)  
BUREAU FILE 62-116395-316

REC-104

Enclosed herewith for your approval and transmittal to the HSC and the SSC are separate memoranda each enclosing a memorandum entitled "Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities," which was prepared at the oral request of Representative Lucien H. Nedzi and which has been coordinated with the intelligence community.

Copies of the memoranda and enclosures are being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 8

- 1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: K. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

ENCLOSURE

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
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LFS:dmt/lhb/hb  
(12)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP8/BJA/STP

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
 1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland  
 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
     (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

62-116464

June 19, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
 1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

**HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
 INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**

Attached is a copy of a memorandum entitled "Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities," which has been prepared pursuant to the oral request of Representative Lucien N. Nedzi. The procedures outlined in the enclosed memorandum are already being followed with regard to the Senate Select Committee, which has been furnished a copy separately.

**Enclosure**

1 - The Attorney General

LFS:dmt/lhb lhb  
 (10)

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 DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2KMB/BJF

**NOTE:**

Representative Nedzi orally requested preparation of a Memorandum of Understanding setting forth investigative and clearance procedures which we have been following with the SSC and which Mr. Nedzi indicated would be agreeable to his Committee. The Memorandum of Understanding was prepared and was coordinated with CIA and appropriate representatives of the Intelligence Community Staff who recommended certain changes which were set forth in memorandum from W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall, 6/3/75. The latter memorandum recommended that the revised Memorandum of Understanding be forwarded to the

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 Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

62-116395-318

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

**ENCLOSURE**

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

NOTE CONTINUED:

Attorney General for his approval and subsequent transmittal to Mr. Nedzi. In accord with the recommendation in memorandum from G. R. Steel to Mr. W. V. Cleveland 6/10/75, a copy is also being furnished to the Attorney General for transmittal to the Senate Select Committee.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: House Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/19/75

House Select Committee on Intelligence Actvts  
Caption of Document: Procedures for Determining Eligibil-  
ity on the Part of Employees of the Senate and  
House Select Committees on Intelligence

Activities FBI  
Originating Office:

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor Date: 6/25/75 <sup>415</sup><sub>P</sub>

Received by: [Signature]

Title: Staff Director

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

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DATE 10-6-2008 BY SP2ACM/Pyg  
MDR-16

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities . . .

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned Committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information, in accordance with Executive Order 11652 and, where necessary, for access to compartmented information in accordance with the standards set forth in Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1-14.

The FBI will furnish a summary memorandum containing the results of its investigation to the appropriate Committee Chairman.

In the case of an applicant, or employee, the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the person's suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined

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DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2AKM/BJP  
MDP-16

62-116395-316  
ENCLOSURE

by the respective Chairman to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman may wish to have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI, with a request for the DCI's advice. In all instances, the Committee Chairman will make the final determination.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:  
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/19/75

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

☒ SSC

☒ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum with an attached Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, Chairman, HSC,  
orally requested MOU regarding investigation and  
clearance procedures

6. CLASSIFICATION OF  
INFORMATION (enter  
U, C, S, TS or  
Codeword)

U

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

Agreements, other  
Organization and Staffing

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

MOU entitled "Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities," furnished to HSC and SSC.

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DATE 10-11-2000 BY SP2AUM/BJP

MDR-16

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-8

62-116395  
62-116464

SFP:1hb  
(6)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN  
CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS-72-25

## INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Cleveland *W*

FROM : G. R. Steel *RS*

SUBJECT: SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

DATE: 6-10-75

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

Reference is made to the memorandum of Mr. W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall dated 6-3-75, concerning the above committees. Attached for approval was a revised draft of the Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for Staff Members of captioned Committees. It was pointed out that in accordance with opinion expressed by John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy, Intelligence Community Staff, and Donald E. Moore, Chairman, Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding will not be furnished to Senator Church. The revised draft is to be furnished the Attorney General for his approval.

It is felt that we are confronted with a complex legal problem here and it would appear that if the Senate Select Committee is a party to the Memorandum of Understanding, it is entitled to a copy of such communication to prevent any misunderstanding in the future and to protect the FBI which has drawn up this Memorandum of Understanding.

Inserted in the revised draft are references to Executive Order (EO) 11652 and Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) No. 1/14. Both are limited in their stated application to the Executive Branch and here their application is being extended to the Legislative Branch, which apparently has no established clearance procedure nor suitability for employment program. Of particular interest is that part of the "Personnel Security Approval Criteria" under DCID 1/14 which reads: "The individual shall be stable, of excellent character and discretion and of unquestioned loyalty to the United States."

62-116395

1 - Mr. Adams  
1 - Mr. Mintz  
1 - Mr. Wannall  
1 - Mr. Cregar

1 - Mr. ~~Schwartz~~  
1 - Mr. Cleveland  
1 - Mr. Steel  
1 - Mr. Egan

RHE : mem

CONTINUED OVER

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Let # 102 6/12/74 - A LHM 704242, S5445C  
LF Sidmt. 1146

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Memorandum to Mr. Cleveland  
Re: Senate and House Select Committees  
on Intelligence Activities

Referenced memorandum pointed out that Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore were of the opinion that since Senator Church's Committee was already following the procedures outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding, and had completed the Committee Staff, it would be inappropriate to furnish a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding to Senator Church. How would the Senate Select Committee know it is following the procedures outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding if it does not have a copy? Does it have a copy of DCID 1/14 which has been, and possibly still is, classified?

The FBI has now received a request for a total of 122 investigations from the Senate Select Committee. This is many more than anticipated with all expenses absorbed by the FBI in connection with a function of the Legislative Branch. In addition, 16 requests have been received to date from the House Select Committee. Also the FBI has been asked by the Senate Select Committee to conduct additional investigation concerning Patricia Ann Monaco, already employed by the Committee, who admits living with Neal Stevens up to 4-75, and frequenting a lounge known as a hangout for prostitutes. Neal Stevens has said he engaged "in all forms of sexual activities" with Monaco. There is also the definite possibility that we will have to process many of these cases under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act of 1974.

To date notification has been received from the Director of Central Intelligence (CIA) that a total of 49 employees of the Senate Select Committee have been certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 (Security Requirements for Government Employment) for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret. Of this number, 17 staff members have been briefed on compartmented information and an additional 5 staff members designated to receive compartmented information. From the above it is not clear that, as stated by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore, that the Senate Select Committee "had completed the Committee Staff."

It is noted that CIA refers to EO 10450 but the Memorandum of Understanding, as approved by CIA, does not refer to EO 10450.

Memorandum to Mr. Cleveland  
Re: Senate and House Select Committees  
on Intelligence Activities

RECOMMENDATION: That the recommendation in referenced memorandum of 6-3-75, with regard to not furnishing a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding to Senator Church be reconsidered.

WVC

PLM

J. M.

J. M.



OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUN 23 1975

TO: John A. Mintz  
Legal Counsel Division  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: K. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for Intelligence  
Coordination

SUBJECT: Access to Bureau Files Re Halperin Case

Pursuant to my conversation with S/A McNiff, it is requested that the Bureau files in this matter be made available under controlled circumstances to Mr. Shaheen for his review in order to facilitate the Department's resolution of pending requests from the Senate Select Committee.

This memorandum has been discussed with Mr. McNiff, and he anticipates that it will be sent to you.

REC-104

62-116395-315

3 JUL 7 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-5-2001 BY SP2 BUN/pp

MJD-16

62-116395

5-TM

84 JUL 17 1975

Records  
cc: 65-75085



UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 65-75085

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 26, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. J. W. Dalseg  
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to memorandum from K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, to Assistant Director John A. Mintz, Legal Counsel Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated June 23, 1975, captioned "Access to Bureau Files Re Halperin Case."

Pursuant to request contained in referenced communication, Bureau files relating to the Halperin case are available for review under controlled circumstances at FBI Headquarters by Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Deputy Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice.

It would be appreciated if Mr. Shaheen would telephonically contact Special Agent Thomas J. McNiff of this Bureau, Government Interdepartmental Code 175, Extension 4636, for the purpose of finalizing the date and time at which the requested review will be made.

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

Attention: K. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 65-75085

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director's Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TJM:lhblhb  
(11)

REC-104  
FBI

JUL 7 1975

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

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DATE 5/10/82 BY 7858-SR/cle/mrk  
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The Attorney General

NOTE:

Memoranda 6/17/75 and 6/23/75, W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall captioned "Senstudy 75" advised that the Senate Select Committee (SSC) has made several requests of the Bureau for information and documents relating to the so-called "Kissinger 17." This material is being made available to the Department with the caveats that the Government has not publicly admitted to 15 of the coverages involved and that some material contained in the file has been impounded by court order due to the Halperin (one of 17) civil suit. The decision as to whether or not the material prepared in response to the SSC's request is to be turned over to the Committee was left to the Department. As mentioned in above memoranda, Mr. O'Connor advised that he believed it necessary for a representative of his office to personally review the file in question before a knowledgeable determination could be made as to what material should be turned over to the SSC. In anticipation of the Department's request, Legal Counsel Division inquired of the Department's Civil Division as to whether the court order of impoundment would prevent such a review. On 6/20/75, it was ascertained that USDC Judge John Lewis Smith, who issued the impoundment order, gave court clearance to make the "Kissinger 17" file available to the Department for review as indicated above.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
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Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO : J. B. Adams

DATE: April 23, 1975

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By memorandum dated April 18, 1975, we advised the Attorney General that one document (memorandum dated May 20, 1954, captioned "Microphone Surveillance") requested by captioned Committee originated with the Department and the determination as to whether or not it should be released to the Committee should be made by the Department. It was also pointed out to the Department this particular document, while it is classified, had been printed publicly by the United States Government Printing Office.

On April 22, 1975, Jack Fuller, Assistant to the Attorney General, telephonically advised the Department was declassifying the document and requested the Bureau declassify its copy.

ACTION:

Intelligence Division declassify Departmental Memorandum captioned, "Microphone Surveillance," dated May 20, 1954.

62-116395

1-Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1-Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1-Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1-Mr. P. V. Daly

PVD:lgr  
(6)

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DATE 10-5-2000 BY SPAIN/PP  
MDR-16

DOCUMENT  
DECLASSIFIED 4/28/75  
BY T.E. BURNS  
PER INSTRUCTION  
4/28/75 KB

REC-100

JCF 62-116395-313  
JBA  
PLM

JUN 10 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

The Attorney General

June 4, 1975

Director, FBI

0  
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Item number one a. of Part I, "Policies and Procedures," Appendix B of referenced letter requested Committee Staff access to all indices and control files pertaining to SAC Memoranda and SAC Letters for 1960 to the present.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is an original of a memorandum advising the Committee that the above-requested material is presently available for examination at FBI Headquarters by appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

ENCLOSURE

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: K. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

EX-108  
REC-63

62-116395-312  
JUN 27 1975

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TEB:cmc  
(9)

P.V. [Signature]  
Room 5095B

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-5-2000 BY SP-1000/PL

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - T. E. Burns

62-116395

June 4, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO  
THE FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Reference is made to letter dated May 14, 1975,  
with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and  
other information from the FBI.

Pursuant to your request for access to all indices  
and control files pertaining to SAC Memoranda and Letters, for  
1960 to the present, we currently have such material available  
for review at FBI Headquarters by appropriately cleared  
personnel of the Committee.

1 - The Attorney General

TEB:cmc  
(8)

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-05-2001 BY SP2ACM/ajp  
MDP-46

NOTE:

The material available consists of Xeroxes of index  
cards covering all SAC Letters and Memos for the period in  
question. The cards contain the SAC Letter or Memorandum  
number, date, subject matter covered, and the location where  
copies of the SAC Letter or Memorandum have been filed. The  
file numbers have not been excised in order to avoid unnecessary  
extensive effort since there is no apparent reason why the  
SSC representative could not view such file numbers. The  
Xeroxed indices cards commence with SAC Letter 60-1 dated  
January 5, 1960, and conclude with SAC Memorandum number 22-75,  
dated May 20, 1975.

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/4/75

U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Govt.

Caption of Document:

Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities: Re: Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Dept. of Justice; Policies and Procedures

Originating Office:

FBI

Delivered by:

Richard Taylor, Jr.

Date:

10:55 AM  
June 7, 75

Received by:

Sherry Towell

Title:

Asst Off. Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-6-2000 BY SP7 HUN/af

MDR-16

62-116395-312

ENCLOSURE

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE  
BEFORE COMPLETING.TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central IndexFROM:  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available  
for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/4/75

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

☒ SSC☐ HSC4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,  
interviewee, testifier and subject)

Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Department of Justice.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-  
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix B, Part 1, Item 1a.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF  
INFORMATION (enter  
U, C, S, TS or  
Codeword)

"U"

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are  
used underline for emphasis)

OPERATING PROCEDURES

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

SSC was advised that internal documents advising field  
offices of clarification and/or revisions in operating procedures  
are available for review by appropriate SSC personnel at FBI  
Headquarters.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-5-2000 BY SP8/MLP  
MDP-16

TREAT AS YELLOW

WOG  
EWJTJM:1hb  
(4)ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN  
CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

62-116395

6-24-75 LFS

5-7-75

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

62-116395-312

ENCLOSURE

71  
64

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

Legal Counsel to Adams, Memo  
Re: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REQUESTS.

Hearings:

We are scheduled to testify 6-18-75, before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Judiciary on Terrorism. Testimony for this hearing has been prepared by the Intelligence Division.

We anticipate having to testify before the Post Office, Civil Service Subcommittee on Postal Fees, Mail and Label Management. The necessary materials for the testimony have been gathered and as soon as a request has been received, the testimony will be prepared in final form. The testimony will concern mail covers.

The following Committees have indicated that they will request Bureau testimony in the near future:

The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (Tunney's Committee); Topic: S. 1427 - S. 1428 (Criminal Justice legislation); Briefing book has been prepared concerning this legislation.

House Judiciary Committee on Civil and Constitutional Rights; Topic: H. R. 61 and H. R. 62 (House version of S. 1427 and S. 1428 (Criminal Justice legislation)).

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities; Topic: Bureau legal authority to conduct domestic and counter-intelligence activities. Tentative testimony is scheduled for late June or early July. We will be furnished additional details by the Committee as to the various topics to be covered during this testimony.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

*per JHA*  
*14*  
*JHA*  
*per JHA*  
*JHA*

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. G. Cregar  
1 - Mr. A. F. Watters

The Attorney General

June 17, 1975

Director, FBI

SUGGESTIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE AND  
LEGISLATIVE ACTION RELATIVE TO  
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS

Attached for your approval and forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, is a response to a request received from Mr. Wilderotter for suggestions for administrative and legislative action relative to the United States intelligence programs.

Mr. Wilderotter's request was forwarded to the FBI in a May 30, 1975, communication from the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) Ad Hoc Coordinating Group, a copy of which is also being enclosed for your information.

Your concurrence in our response is requested.

Enclosures (3)

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-5-2000 BY SPACM/PP

MDR-16

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosures - 2)  
Attention: K. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

AFW:kjg/jmn jmn  
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.:  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

EX 103

REC-7

62-116395

311

JUL 08 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

The Attorney General

NOTE:

By memorandum from Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 6/3/75 captioned "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," Legal Counsel Division transmitted an "Eyes Only" communication, dated 5/30/75, from the Executive Secretary of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group. In its communication, the USIB Group requested that recipients furnish Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, with suggestions for administrative or legislative action relative to United States intelligence programs.

In response to USIB's request on behalf of Mr. Wilderotter, INTD Supervisors have been canvassed for suggestions and results obtained incorporated in communication being attached for Attorney General's approval. Since USIB's communication was marked "Eyes Only," we have not specifically referenced this document in our response to Mr. Wilderotter. We are, however, providing copies of the USIB letter and our response for the Attorney General's records and for the Office of the Deputy Attorney General. The latter action would appear appropriate, since the Department of Justice was included among the recipients of the USIB letter, although Inspector John B. Hotis of the Legal Counsel Division was erroneously designated as the Departmental addressee by USIB.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

REC-102 *index all*

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75-2274  
30 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Security Clearances

*Sensitivity 1975*

Attached is an updated listing of staff personnel certified by the Staff Director/Senate Select Committee as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET. Some of these individuals have been certified as meeting the requirements of DCID 1/14 and have been provided the appropriate briefing.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9-29-2000 BY SP2A/MBY

Attachment

*Jack E. Thomas*  
John M. Clarke  
Associate Deputy to the DCI  
for the Intelligence Community

REC-102

62-116395-308

3 JUL 2 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE            BY           

*Records  
Please file in  
62-116395*

*5-P*

84 JUL 3 1975

IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES

30 JUN 1975.

Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET.

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
<del>Aaron, David</del>	*	B 4/15	8-21-38	Ill.	550-44-7971	
<del>Bader, William</del>	*	B 4/17	9-8-31	NJ	545-30-3377	TF Badge
<del>Bayly, John</del>	*	B 5/19	1-26-44	DC	578-60-2305	
<del>Banoff, Barbara</del>	*	B 6/26	12-20-45	Cal.	561-68-9123	
<del>Barkey, Howard</del>	*	B 6/2	1-26-17	Mo.	490-01-6758	
<del>Baron, Frederick</del>	*	B 5/19	12-2-47	Conn.	494-54-5241	
<del>Benz, Charity I.</del>	*	B 5/23	7-23-46	NY	053-38-7410	
<del>Birdsell, Wayne</del>			5-2-06	DC	578-03-1841	
<del>Bouschard, Samuel</del>	*	B 6/10	3-12-24	Maine	007-18-3292	
<del>Brissett, Belva</del>	*	B 6/10	6-23-41	Ok.	440-44-6374	
<del>Brooks, Nancy</del>	*	B 5/23	2-14-40	Ky.	313-38-6773	
<del>Brown, C. Harold</del>			6-6-38	Ohio	278-34-3428	
<del>Brown, Maxine</del> ✓	*	B 6/26	8-8-28	Ida.	568-40-3123	
<del>Carpenter, Margaret</del>	*	B 5/19	8-27-44	Cal.	555-62-6129	

62-11675-308

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 1-26-2005 BY SP2/AM/af  
MDR-66

30 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
<del>Carter, Barry</del>	*	B 4/24	12-14-42	Cal.	567-56-8854	
<del>Chesnick, Barbara</del>			4-18-46	WI	390-46-2235	
<del>Davis, Lynn</del>	*	B 4/17(Port)	9-6-43	Fl.	042-36-9155	TF Badge
<del>Dawson, Thomas</del>	*	B 6/26	9-9-52	Minn.	471-60-1688	
<del>Dawson, Rhett</del>	*	B 5/19	12-9-43	Ill.	351-34-4329	
<del>DeMarco, James</del> ✓	*	B 6/26	3-12-43	W. Va.	286-36-9097	
<del>Dennin, Joseph Francis</del> ✓	*	B 6/23	6-9-43	NY	567-62-5353	
<del>DeOreo, Mary</del>	*	B 6/26	6-13-47	Ohio	287-42-6258	
<del>DiGenova, Joseph E.</del> ✓	*	B 6/26	2-22-45	Del.	222-28-5430	
<del>Dick, James</del> ✓	*	B 6/26	7-25-47	Mass.	029-36-6745	
<del>Dillon, Molly</del>	*	B 6/10	4-16-51	Va.	150-38-4588	
<del>Doolittle, Patricia</del>			8-12-43	NC	213-42-6360	
<del>Dwyer, Daniel</del>			8-24-52	Ma.	023-44-8792	
<del>Elliff, John</del>	*	B 5/23	6-30-41	DC	345-34-2468	
<del>Epstein, Michael Taylor</del>	*	B 6/26	3-10-37	Mass.	026-28-6318	
<del>Enno, Joan</del>			8-30-46	DC	215-46-2988	

30 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
<del>Fenn, Peter</del>	*	B 4/24	12-12-47	Ma.	213-50-1123	
<del>Ford, Harold</del> ✓	*	B 6/26	3-23-21	Cal.	550-16-4630	
<del>enstein, Mark Henry</del>	*	B 5/28	3-7-46	Ala.	420-60-8767	
<del>Greissing, Edward</del>			11-27-50	Germany	296-50-4113	
<del>Harrigan, Arthur</del>	*	B 5/19	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
<del>Hatry, Audrey Helen</del>	*	B 5/19	6-10-23	Md	216-14-8691	
<del>Inderfurth, Mark K.</del>	*	B 4/29	9-29-46	NC	245-74-5617	TF Badge
<del>Iverson, Portia</del>			10-22-50	W. Va.	233-84-0847	
<del>Jefferson, Arthur M.</del> ✓	*	B 6/26	3-16-44	NY	141-34-1031	
<del>Johnson, Dorothy</del>			6-8-25	Or.	540-20-6413	
<del>Johnson, Loch</del>	*	B 4/29	2-21-42	N. Zealand	566-62-0478	
<del>Karalekas, Anne</del>	*	B 5/28	11-6-46	Ma.	023-36-4329	
<del>Kelley, Robert</del>	*	B 5/19	10-29-40	Ind.	559-54-1348	
<del>Kieves, Lawrence</del>	*	B 5/19	1-4-48	NY	068-38-6464	
<del>Kirbow, Charles</del>	*	B 4/24	10-2-22	Ga.	252-12-5112	TF Badge
<del>Kilchheimer, Joseph</del> ✓			6-3-17	Ill.	359-03-7843	

30 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)				
Koppal, Diane ✓	*	B 6/26	6-24-48	NC	219-48-0018	
LaVoy, Diane	*	B 6/10	11-10-48	Venezuela	JFK Act 5 (g) (2) (D)	
Liebengood, Howard			12-29-42	In.	307-44-9707	
Lombard, Charles	*	B 4/24	6-2-30	France	578-44-9471	Badge
Lynch, Mary			3-16-26	W. Va.	250-38-1344	
MacDonald, Naldeen			10-19-51	Brazil	225-78-8708	
Madigan, Michael James	*	B 4/15	4-18-43	DC	042-34-3797	TF Badge
Marshall, Benjamin	*	B 4/17	5-4-19	NE	485-28-4503	
Marshall, Burke			10-1-22	NJ	577-44-5241	
Mascioli, Cynthia ✓	*	B 6/26	1-4-51	NY	112-44-7636	
Mason, Judy	*	B 6/10	1-6-46	DC	578-60-7280	
Maxwell, Elliot Everett	*	B 4/15	7-24-46	NY	133-34-4225	TF Badge
Mayo, Betty ✓	*	B 6/26	2-13-22	Ohio	277-14-4062	
Mecham, Martha Evans	*	B 5/23	2-11-40	Cal.	528-48-6848	
Miller, William G.	*	B 4/15	8-15-31	NY	109-26-4349	
Monaco, Patricia	*	B 5/23	10-17-35	NJ	157-26-8100	

30 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.
	Designated	Briefed (SI, TK, B)			
/ Moore, Janet	*	B 5/23	4-9-43	Iowa	484-52-9820
/ Murphy, Michael	*		10-13-54	Tex.	231-86-8829
/ O'Flaherty, James Daniel	*	B 4/15	11-4-42	Ill.	239-62-8495
- Orloff, Jan	*	B 6/26	11-14-47	Cal.	558-74-8394
/ Owens, Drena	*	B 6/2	12-8-42	NC	242-68-3271
- Peterson, John F.	*	B 6/26	6-15-41	Cal.	565-56-7707
- Pitts, Susan	*	B 6/10	10-24-53	Canada	020-40-7638
- Pyle, Christopher	*	B 6/26	11-24-39	Mass.	019-30-9898
/ Quanbeck, Elton	*	B 5/19	5-15-26	N. Dak.	501-14-4534
- Rhea, Gordon	*	B 6/26	3-10-45	Va.	412-74-7901
- Ricks, Walter	*	B 6/26	12-27-46	Ga.	244-74-4304
/ Romberg, Alan	*	B 4/22	12-1-38	NY	107-30-8583
/ Rowe, James	*	B 5/19	6-6-51	DC	579-62-6719
/ Schneider, Ruth	*	B 5/23	10-31-44	Conn.	008-32-0180
Schwarz, Frederick A. O. III	*	B 4/15	4-20-35	NY	084-30-2047
/ Seidel, Lester	*	B 6/26	7-17-44	DC	216-38-5204

Badge

30 JUN 1975

Name	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.
	<u>Designated</u>	<u>Briefed</u> (SI, TK, B)			
Shea, Patrick	*	B 4/15	2-28-48	Utah	528-64-1965
Shelburn, Frank			5-30-13	Va.	338-24-6934
Smith, Elizabeth	*	B 5/19	6-21-49	NY	076-42-0199
Smith, John L.	*	B 6/26	3-3-39	Ky.	400-52-5800
Smith, Stephanie			3-23-54	Ohio	282-58-6476
Smothers, Curtis	*	B 5/16	8-26-43	Md.	220-38-9869
Snider, Lewis Brittle	*	B 4/24	1-12-45	NC	246-72-0956
Talley, Martha	*	B 6/26	9-7-50	NC	245-88-1368
Thoben, Florence			6-2-10	Ind.	313-12-1857
Thomas, Robert			12-16-25	Md.	219-14-5186
Towell, Mary	*	B 6/10	4-25-44	Tenn.	566-64-7628
Treverton, Gregory	*	B 6/2	1-21-47	Colo.	524-62-2459
Trueheart, William	*	B 6/2	12-18-18	Va.	225-20-6411
Tschirgi, James	*	B 6/26	2-23-25	Wyo.	520-16-7290
Wallach, Paul	*	B 6/26	5-24-47	NY	149-36-2999
Ward, Fred			11-20-40	DC	225-50-9983

Badge

30 JUN 1975

<u>Name</u>	Compartmented Clearance		Date and Place of Birth		Social Security No.	
	<u>Designated</u>	<u>Briefed</u> (SI, TK, B)				
<del>/</del> Wides, Burton. Victor	*	B 4/17	6-14-41	NJ	139-30-1936	TF Badge
<del>/</del> Wiik, Carol Ann	*	B 5/23	4-21-51	Mass.	017-40-7170	
<del>/</del> Wilson, Otis	*	B 6/10	5-16-20	Va.	557-14-5461	
<del>/</del> Zimmerman, Peter Brown		already briefed	3-26-46	Ill.	227-60-1093	
<del>/</del> Zimmerman, Phebe			12-1-50	Ohio	271-54-1724	

7:09PM 6/25/75 NITEL RXG

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)

FROM SAC, NEWARK (66-3971)

SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep.-A.D.-Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Dep.-A.D.-Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
   Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
   Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
   Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
   Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
   Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
   Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
   Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
   Intell. \_\_\_\_\_ *W.K.W.*  
   Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
   Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
   Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
   Training \_\_\_\_\_  
 Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

RE NKTELETYPE 6/5/75 CAPTIONED AS ABOVE AND TELCALL, BUREAU SUPERVISOR SEYMOUR PHILLIPS TO ASAC JOHN J. SCHWARTZ, 6/25/75 IN RESPECT TO FBIHQ'S INQUIRY FOR A MEMORANDUM FROM FORMER SA LEO T. CLARK TO SAC OR ASAC, NEWARK, DURING JULY AND AUGUST, 1964, WHICH ALLEGEDLY WAS CONTAINED IN NK FILE 62-109276.

NEWARK DETERMINED THAT FILE NO. 62-109276 IS THE BUREAU  
FILE NUMBER PERTAINING TO PROTECTION OF THE PRESIDENT. FURTHER  
EFFORT TO LOCATE FORMER SA CLARK'S MEMORANDUM IN NEWARK FILE  
157-1602 PERTAINING TO RACIAL DEMONSTRATIONS, DEMOCRATIC  
NATIONAL CONVENTION, ATLANTIC CITY, N. J., 8/24-27/64; (RM);  
WERE NEGATIVE.

END

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9-58-2001 BY SP2ALM/34

MOR-16

REC- 102

62-116395-307

3 JUL 2 1975

NEGATIVE.

HOLD

*Surrounding circumstances of Mike's death, Sept 10  
Paul Daly, Supervisor, by Daly that no  
memos of Clark in 62-169276 (Paul's no  
NR file as claimed) N in 159-160 REC.  
5 - B*

Place

Place in Records  
62-116395

#C307

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN  
JOHN G. TOWEN, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.  
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.  
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.  
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.  
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, TENN.  
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.  
CHARLES MCC. MATTHEWS, JR., MD.  
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR  
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL  
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

# United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

JUN 26 10 54 AM '75

DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
MAIL ROOM  
ORGN

June 23, 1975

*See memo from Council  
to Attorney General  
dated 6/27/75 - PWD/relc*

The Honorable Edward H. Levi  
The Attorney General  
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

*Sens study 75*

The Select Committee proposes to interview the following employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice with respect to the case of Douglas Durham, an informant employed by the Bureau prior to March 1975:

Joseph L. Hearsley  
F.B.I.

Des Moines, Iowa

John McFee  
F.B.I.

Omaha, Nebraska

Larry L. Astoki  
F.B.I.

Des Moines, Iowa

David Hedgecock  
F.B.I.

REC-102

62-116395-306

Des Moines, Iowa

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

Robert Taubert  
F.B.I.

3 JUL 2 1975  
St. Paul, Minnesota

Ray Williams  
F.B.I.

FED. BU. OF INVESTIGATION  
St. Paul, Minnesota

Douglas Hofer  
F.B.I.


JUL 23 1975  
St. Paul, Minnesota

R. D. Hurd  
U. S. Attorney

R.A.D.  
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS  
FED. BU. OF INVESTIGATION

*file 62-116325*

*FBI*  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9-28-00 BY SP-1000/100




The Honorable Edward H. Levi  
Page Two

June 23, 1975

The Committee has authorized the staff to conduct an investigation of matters pertaining to the above-named informant. Preparations will be made to interview the above-named employees in St. Paul and Des Moines. Liaison officials at the Bureau and the Department of Justice will be contacted shortly by Patrick Shea of the Select Committee staff with regard to the details of these interviews.

This investigation may involve specific allegations of abuse or other controversial matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred. It is not anticipated that these interviews will be monitored by the Bureau or the Department of Justice, as they will relate to alleged abuses falling within the mandate of the Committee pursuant to Senate Resolution 21.

Sincerely,

  
Frank Church  
Chairman

cc: William O'Connor  
Paul Daley

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

REC-102

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
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Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. O. Cregar *WOC*

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

- DATE: 6/23/75
- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
  - 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
  - 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
  - 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
  - 1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
  - 1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
  - 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
  - 1 - Mr. J. W. Dalseg
  - 1 - Mr. J. P. Lee
  - 1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

This is to record assignments of FBI representatives to coordinate with Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) Task Force (TF) leaders on ICS TFs for which FBI does not have primary responsibility.

My memorandum to you 6/17/75 reported upon a 6/13/75 meeting chaired by Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, to discuss the functions of TFs in connection with investigation of the intelligence community by the Senate Select Committee (SSC). An enclosure to that memorandum listed the various TFs and indicated those regarding which the FBI was expected to be involved with. We were asked to designate a specific individual who would coordinate with the TF leader of TFs which were not assigned to FBI representatives. The following designations are proposed:

Subject	Principal Agency	TF Leader	FBI Representatives
Electronic surveillance and warrantless wiretap	Justice	George Calhoun IDS 187-4401	J. W. Dalseg
Use of proprietary CIA organizations	CIA	Erich Isenstead Green 3140	W. A. Branigan
Mail cover and intercept	Justice	Phil White IDS 187-4674	J. P. Lee

REC-102 62-116395-305

62-116395

JPT:bkbbrd  
(12)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-16-2004 BY SP2A/CMB

CONTINUED - OVER

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 6875  
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: SENSTUDY 75  
62-116395

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Principal Agency</u>	<u>TF Leader</u>	<u>FBI Representatives</u>
Watch list	DoD	Benson Buffham (NSA) 688-7222	R. L. Shackelford
Domestic surveillance	Justice	John Martin IDS 187-4555	J. G. Deegan

To date, "Notices" from the SSC specifically defining the areas to be covered under above topics, have not been received. They are to be sent to the TF leaders who will then contact our representatives as needed. Attached for the information of each of the above designees are single copies of aforementioned 6/17/75 memorandum, explaining the TFs, and ICS memorandum 6/10/75 showing TF assignments as of that date.

ACTION:

With your approval, the ICS Steering Group will be informed that the aforementioned FBI personnel have been designated to assist in the listed TFs.

JPT @ EWS

11/15/75

NAMES AND BUREAU  
PHONE NUMBERS FURNISHED  
TO MR. J. PERRY GILES, IC STAFF,  
6/30/75. LFS

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten signature]* *[Handwritten signature]*

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*[Handwritten signature]*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

2 - J. A. Mintz  
(1 - J. B. Hotis)  
1 - W. R. Wannall  
June 23, 1975  
1 - W. O. Cregar  
1 - T. E. Burns  
1 - D. Ryan

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to memorandum from Senate Select Committee, dated May 14, 1975, and appendices thereto, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which is responsive to one of the Committee's requests.

A copy of the memorandum is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: K. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP6AKM/af  
IND 16

DR:pld  
(10)

REC-102

62-116395 304

3 JUL 2 1975

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395

2 - J. A. Mintz  
(1 - J. B. Hotis)  
1 - W. R. Wannall  
1 - W. O. Cregar  
1 - T. E. Burns  
June 23, 1975  
1 - D. Ryan

**UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**

**RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE  
"HUSTON PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND  
OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS**

**COINTELPRO**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2ACM/JP  
MDR-16

Reference is made to memorandum from captioned Committee dated May 14, 1975, and the appendices thereto, which contained requests for information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Item 20, Part II, Appendix C, requested a list of any Cointelpro-type activities, as defined in the prepared statement of Attorney General Saxbe before the House Judiciary Committee on November 20, 1974, which were engaged in by the FBI subsequent to April 28, 1971, be provided.

In response to this request, it is noted all Counter-intelligence Programs (Cointelpros) were discontinued by FBI Headquarters airtel to Albany, with copies to all field offices, dated April 28, 1971. Specifically, this communication listed seven Cointelpros. In addition to the seven mentioned in the April 28, 1971, airtel, subsequent reviews at FBI Headquarters disclosed five additional Cointelpros. In this context, it should be noted several of the 12 Cointelpro operations related to FBI activities in the foreign counter-intelligence field.

FBI Headquarters airtel April 28, 1971, discontinuing the Cointelpros noted as follows, "In exceptional instances where it is considered counterintelligence action is warranted, recommendations should be submitted to the Bureau under the individual case caption to which it pertains. These recommendations will be considered on an individual basis."

1 - The Attorney General

DR:pld

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

See NOTE page 2.

Legal Coun. (9) MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

**Documents Pertaining to the "Huston Plan,"  
Cointelpro, and Other Practices and Programs**

A review of all of our files which have been referred to as Cointelpro files revealed no Cointelpro-type activity since April 28, 1971.

In foreign counterintelligence operations the objectives are detection, penetration and, finally, neutralization of intelligence operations directed against the United States by foreign intelligence services or other hostile elements. Various neutralizing techniques are employed against such services and elements, their officers and their agents in the United States. Among these are double agent operations, disruption, disinformation, penetrations, recruitments, persona non grata action, visa denial and, in rare instances when conditions allow, prosecution. Thus, it can be seen that so-called "Cointelpro-type" techniques are, and always have been, an integral part of our foreign counterintelligence efforts, whether they were practiced in individual cases or under the aegis of a formalized program. This is a critical distinction to be made between our foreign counterintelligence operations and operations conducted in the domestic security field. 66

In an effort to comply fully with the request to provide a list of any Cointelpro-type activities engaged in subsequent to April 28, 1971, in addition to the review of Cointelpro files noted above, personnel of the Intelligence Division were contacted during the week of June 2-6, 1975, to determine if any had knowledge of any such actions. Excepting foreign counterintelligence operations, the results of this inquiry were negative.

**NOTE:**

See letter to the Attorney General, dated 6/23/75, captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," prepared by DR:pld.

It is noted in one instance one individual alluded to the TARPPO disinformation-type operation which has been directed against the Soviet intelligence service as being of a Cointelpro character. It is not believed this latter technique constitutes the type of information sought by the Committee.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6-23-75

U. S. Senate Select Committee Re:  
Caption of Document: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE "HUSTON  
PLAN, "COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES  
AND PROGRAMS; COINTELPRO

Originating Office: Appendix C, Part II, Item 20 FBI

Delivered by: Richard J. Taylor Jr. Date: 6/25/75 1:15 PM

Received by: Mildred B. MacDonald (clerk)

Title: \_\_\_\_\_

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-28-2000 BY SP2AM/fg  
MDR-16

TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:  
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

6/23/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

U

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix C, Part II, Item #20, requested information as to COINTELPRO (Counterintelligence Program) activities.

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

Counterintelligence  
Intelligence activities, foreign

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Memorandum discussed the various COINTELPROS, their discontinuance and how counterintelligence activities in the foreign field are sometimes carried out in individual cases rather than through a formalized program.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9-28-2008 BY SP2ACM/BP  
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wbc  
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62-116395

SFP:1hb  
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN  
CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-75

## INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - J. A. Mintz  
- Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. Q. Cregar  
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

The Attorney General

June 23, 1975

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices,  
the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the  
Committee is the original of a memorandum responding to one of  
the Committee's requests.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your  
records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: K. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

TEB:jmn jmn  
(9)

REC-102

62-116395-303

3 JUL 2 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

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DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2ACM/MS  
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Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

2 - Mr. A. Mintz  
(1 Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

62-116395

June 23, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO  
THE FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Reference is made to letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Item number 3., Part I, Appendix B of referenced communication requested all general policy memoranda and other materials not already provided the Committee pertaining to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, and activities for the period 1960 to the present.

The above request has already been satisfied by our previous response to other requests contained in the referenced letter and its appendices. We are making specific reference to those responses which furnished the Committee access to the Manual of Rules and Regulations, the Manual of Instructions, the SAC Letters and Memoranda covering the period from 1960 to the present, and pertinent policy memoranda and other representative communications culled from the 100-00 file.

1 - The Attorney General

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
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Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

TEB:jmn  
(8) jmn

ORIGINAL AND ONE TO AG

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9-28-2005 BY SP8ACM/bup  
MDR-16

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

Further Documents Pertaining  
to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

NOTE:

The SSC had originally requested access to all double zero files, however, this request was modified by them during a conference with our representatives 5/30/75, wherein agreement was reached to provide SSC only pertinent memoranda and other representative communications from the 100-00 file.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6-23-75

U.S. Senate Select Committee Re:  
Caption of Document: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE FBI  
AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; POLICIES AND  
PROCEDURES

Originating Office: Appendix B, Part I, Item 3 FBI

Delivered by: Richard S. Taylor, Jr. Date: 6/25/75 <sup>1:50 PM</sup>

Received by: Waldeen B. MacDonald (Clerk)

Title: \_\_\_\_\_

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2AUM/BY  
MDR-16

TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:  
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/23/75

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

### Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix B, Part I, Item #3,  
requested general policy communications in the  
security field

6. CLASSIFICATION OF  
INFORMATION (enter  
U, C, S, TS or  
Codeword)

U

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

Policies and procedures  
Intelligence collection  
Operating procedures

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Response memorandum noted that the request had already been  
satisfied by previous responses to other requests in the same  
5/14/75 SSC letter and appendices.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2ACM/AY  
MDR-16

**TREAT AS YELLOW**

62-116395

SFP:1hb  
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN  
CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-75

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5-18

## INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
June 20, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin  
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached  
appendices, the SSC requested ~~certain~~ information and  
documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to  
the Committee are the original of a memorandum and a copy  
of each of the documents described in such memorandum.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosures is  
being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 13

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: K. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

TEB:dnt  
(10)

REC-102

62-116395-302

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2AUM/AP  
MDR-16

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

62-116395

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin  
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns  
June 20, 1975

**UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**

**RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE "HUSTON  
PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES  
AND PROGRAMS**

**OTHER SPECIFIC FBI PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS**

Reference is made to SSC letter to The Attorney General dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Pursuant to your request in Appendix C, Part III, Item 29, for all memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origins, implementation, and termination of Project INLET, involving preparation of an Intelligence Letter for the President, enclosed are copies of the following documents:

1) W. C. Sullivan memorandum to C. D. DeLoach captioned "FBI Intelligence Letter for the President," dated November 7, 1969, with enclosed letters to the President and The Attorney General.

2) W. C. Sullivan memorandum to C. D. DeLoach captioned "FBI Intelligence Letter for the President," dated November 20, 1969, with enclosed letter to all field offices, captioned "FBI Intelligence Letter for the President Code Name 'Inlet' Research-Satellite Matter," dated November 26, 1969.

3) R. D. Cotter memorandum to W. C. Sullivan captioned "FBI Intelligence Letter for the President," dated April 23, 1970.

4) Letter from the Acting Director to all field offices captioned "FBI Intelligence Letter for the President Code Name 'Inlet' Research Matter," dated December 26, 1972.

TEB:dnt  
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-28-2000 BY SP2A/BK/PJ

MDR-16

PLM waw

12-116-302

ENCLOSURE

TJM

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GPO 554-346

**UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**

5) T. J. Smith memorandum to E. S. Miller captioned "FBI Intelligence Letter for the President Code Name 'Inlet' Research Matter," dated February 2, 1973.

**Enclosures - 8**

**1 - The Attorney General**

**NOTE:**

See W. O. Cregar memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall 6/18/75 captioned "SENSITIVE STUDY." The above material which we are furnishing to the Committee was supplied by SA Thomas J. Deakin, Central Research Unit, IS - 3 Section, INTD, who located the documents and provided sanitized Xerox copies, deleting administrative material.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/20/75

U.S. Senate Select Committee. Re: Documents  
Caption of Document: Pertaining to the "Huston Plan,"

Cointelpro, and other practices and programs;  
Other Specific FBI Practices and Programs.  
Appendix C, Part III, Item 29 FBI

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 6/25/75 <sup>1:15 PM</sup>

Received by: Walden B. Mac Donald (clerk)

Title: \_\_\_\_\_

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2 ACM/lfm  
MDP-16

TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:  
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available, for review but not transmitted, so note.)

2. DATE PROVIDED

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

6/20/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum enclosing a number of FBI communications

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix C, Part III, Item #29, requested FBI communications regarding Project INLET (Intelligence Letter for the President).

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

U

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

Intelligence Collection

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Material furnished SSC covered the origins, implementation, and termination of Project.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2ALM/BJP  
MDR-16

TREAT AS YELLOW

62-116395

SFP:1hb  
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN  
CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-75

## INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
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SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 4/23/70

FROM : R. D. Cotter

SUBJECT: FBI INTELLIGENCE LETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT

This memorandum recommends that we extend our dissemination of the FBI Intelligence Letter (Inlet) to include Vice President Agnew.

Inlet is outgrowth of Director's personal suggestion for a channel of high-level intelligence directly to the President. It has provided medium for furnishing President sensitive and top-level data in which he would have direct interest and has been disseminated only to President and Attorney General. Since first Inlet issued 11/7/69, we have prepared 36 issues which have summarized 120 individual items of significance on a wide range of topics, including racial violence, New Left intrigue, Soviet and communist bloc espionage, and important foreign intelligence data. Material is presented in a one-page format tailored to the President's convenience.

Vice President Agnew in recent conversations with the Director has indicated a keen interest in the information the Bureau has been furnishing him in recent months regarding domestic and foreign subversion. It is obvious the Vice President is relying on the Bureau as a key source of information. In view of Mr. Agnew's vital interest in these matters and the high position he occupies, it is believed we should at this time include him in dissemination to Inlet.

## ACTION:

If the Director approves, the Vice President will be included in future dissemination of this material.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP6ACM/BJP  
MDR-16

SAC, Albany

12/26/72

For the Acting Director, FBI (65-73268)  
W. Mark Felt  
Acting Associate Director

FBI INTELLIGENCE LETTER  
FOR THE PRESIDENT  
CODE NAME "INLET"  
RESEARCH MATTER

ReBulet 11/26/69.

Referenced letter instructed all field offices to furnish the Bureau high-level intelligence data in the security field which was to be furnished to the President and the Attorney General on a continuing basis. All such communications were to be flagged with the code name "Inlet" in the caption.

Since the inception of this program an evolution in policies and practices has occurred and, currently, the information specified in referenced letter is furnished by each field office in form suitable for teletype dissemination to The White House and the Attorney General as well as other interested agencies of the Government. Accordingly, the "Inlet" program has, for all practical purposes, been rendered obsolete and the Bureau is now formally rescinding instructions set forth in referenced letter.

The termination of the "Inlet" program does not relieve the responsibility of all offices to be alert for the intelligence data specified in referenced letter and to submit this information in a timely manner by teletype and in a form suitable for dissemination.

2 - All Field Offices

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9-28-2001 BY SP2ALM/BMP  
MDR-16

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 2/2/73

FROM : T. J. Smith

SUBJECT: FBI INTELLIGENCE LETTER FOR  
THE PRESIDENT, CODE NAME "INLET"  
RESEARCH MATTER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-28-2000 BY SP2AUM/REP  
mjr-16

The FBI Intelligence Letter for the President was instituted in November, 1969, pursuant to then FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's instructions to keep the President fully informed of significant intelligence developments within the purview of the Bureau's security responsibilities. Dissemination was restricted to the President, the Attorney General, and later, the Vice President.

By letter dated November 26, 1969, all FBI field offices were advised to flag information obtained in our investigations important enough for the President's interest with the code word "INLET." This was to include:

1) Information of national or international significance which is security related.

2) Important current or pending developments in major security cases.

3) Current information which is representative of or calls attention to a significant developing intelligence trend.

4) Material which has a bearing on national security, particularly that from sensitive and/or penetrative coverage of foreign establishments, which could affect American relations with foreign countries, or assist in formulating United States policy.

5) "Inside" information concerning demonstrations, disorders, or other civil disruptions which is of more than local significance.

6) Items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities which may be of special interest to the President or the Attorney General.

5 FEB 16 1973

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller  
Re: FBI Intelligence Letter for the President Code Name "INLET"

The FBI had, through several Administrations, furnished various Presidents and Attorneys General important intelligence matters on an individual basis. The Intelligence Letter served to consolidate this information into one document. By August, 1970, changes in our communications capability, including the ability to afford immediate teletype dissemination of intelligence data to The White House and the development of other reporting procedures such as the Summary of Extremist Activities, made the Intelligence Letter no longer necessary. Items submitted for this Letter by the field were disseminated in these other ways. In December, 1972, the use of the code word "INLET" was discontinued and field offices so advised. The field was also advised, however, they had the responsibility to be alert for this type intelligence data.

ACTION:

For information.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: 11/20/69

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: FBI INTELLIGENCE LETTER  
FOR THE PRESIDENT

This is to recommend that attached letter be approved for sending to all field offices to advise them of the initiation of captioned intelligence letter and to furnish them instructions for the submission of material suitable for use in this letter. Transmission of captioned letter to the President on a continuing basis has been approved in accordance with the Director's instructions to keep the President fully informed of significant intelligence developments within the purview of the Bureau's security responsibilities.

## RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter be approved for field-wide dissemination. If approved, this memorandum should be returned to the Research-Satellite Section, Domestic Intelligence Division, for further processing of enclosure.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 01-28-20 BY SP4M/pj  
MDR-76

SAC, Albany

November 26, 1969

Director, FBI

FBI INTELLIGENCE LETTER  
FOR THE PRESIDENT  
CODE NAME "THULET"  
RESEARCH-SATELLITE MATTER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-28-2000 BY SPACN/BJP

MDL-16

Captioned letter has been initiated at the Bureau to furnish high-level intelligence data in the security field to the President and the Attorney General on a continuing basis. This letter will not be a vehicle for routine dissemination; rather it will be comprised of information obtained in connection with our investigations which has the qualities of importance and timeliness necessary to secure the President's interest and to provide him with meaningful intelligence for his guidance. Mere rumors or nebulous information will have no place in this letter.

It will be the responsibility of each field office to furnish the Bureau on a continuing basis intelligence items suitable for this letter. Each office must, in the course of its normal business and submissions of information to the Bureau, be alert to flag specific items for this purpose. For your guidance the following are suggested types of information (not all-inclusive) that would be appropriate for this intelligence letter:

- (1) Information of national or international significance which is security related.
- (2) Important current or pending developments in major security cases.
- (3) Current information which is representative of or calls attention to a significant developing intelligence trend.
- (4) Material which has a bearing on national security, particularly that from sensitive and/or penetrative coverage of foreign establishments, which could affect American relations with foreign countries, or assist in formulating United States policy.

2 - All other Offices

Letter to Albany  
FBI INTELLIGENCE LETTER  
FOR THE PRESIDENT  
CODE NAME "INLET"  
RESEARCH-SATELLITE MATTER

(5) "Inside" information concerning demonstrations, disorders or other civil disruptions which is of more than local significance.

(6) Items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities which may be of special interest to the President or the Attorney General.

All information submitted to the Bureau by your office in investigations concerning old-line subversive organizations, new left groups, racial matters, hate groups, and espionage and counterintelligence matters should be carefully reviewed daily for any items deemed pertinent to this intelligence letter. Communications containing such items should be submitted by the most expeditious means warranted and should be flagged with the code name "Inlet" after the title and character. In those instances where an airtel or letter is used, an additional copy should be furnished the Bureau.

These instructions are to be implemented immediately. It is absolutely essential that a steady flow of quality intelligence data be received from all field offices to make this letter a success. Your submissions will be closely followed at the Bureau to insure this matter is receiving proper emphasis and attention.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: November 7, 1969

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: FBI INTELLIGENCE LETTER  
FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pursuant to the Director's instructions to keep the President fully informed of significant intelligence developments within the purview of the Bureau's security responsibilities, we will prepare and transmit to him, on a continuing basis, an intelligence letter of the type enclosed. To preserve the impact and selectivity of this letter, dissemination is suggested for only the President and the Attorney General.

## RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letters to the President and the Attorney General be approved enclosing the proposed current intelligence letter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2ACM/PP  
MDR-16

November 7, 1969

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

There is enclosed for your information a document containing items of current intelligence interest. This paper has been prepared to highlight certain timely developments in our security and intelligence investigations. Material of this type will be furnished to you in this manner on a continuing basis.

A copy of this document is being sent to the Attorney General. Upon removal of the classified enclosure, this letter becomes unclassified.

Sincerely yours,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9-28-2008 BY SP2AM/BJP

MDR-16

The Attorney General

November 7, 1969

Director, FBI

FBI INTELLIGENCE LETTER  
FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is enclosed for your information a document containing items of current intelligence interest. This paper has been prepared to highlight certain timely developments in our security and intelligence investigations. Material of this type will be furnished to you in this manner on a continuing basis.

This document has also been made available to the President. Upon removal of the classified enclosure, this letter becomes unclassified.

Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 9-28-2000 BY SP2Aun/cry  
MDR-16

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams  
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis

June 19, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan  
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Enclosed for your information is the original of  
a memorandum concerning the testimony of retired FBI  
Special Agent Robert R. Nichols before an Executive Session  
of captioned Committee. A copy of the memorandum is also  
enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter,  
Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: K. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 67-414885 (Personnel File Robert R. Nichols)  
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)  
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:mjg  
(15)

for info. only per J. G. Deegan's instructions  
5 copies sent to CFR - Dept of Justice  
11/22/76 - JCB

ENCLOSURE

REC-102

62-116395-301

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10-31-80 BY SP5RSC/RSK

Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir.: \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. \_\_\_\_\_  
Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_  
Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_  
Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Ident. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inspection \_\_\_\_\_  
Intell. \_\_\_\_\_  
Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_  
Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_  
Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_  
Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM ☒

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

1975

GPO 255-54

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62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

- 1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
- 1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

June 19, 1975

- 1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
- 1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

**U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)**

**RE: TESTIMONY OF RETIRED FBI  
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) ROBERT R.  
NICHOLS BEFORE SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION**

Set out below are the facts known to the FBI concerning sworn testimony given to the SSC by Mr. Robert R. Nichols who served as an SA of the FBI from January 6, 1947, until his retirement May 12, 1972. This information is as voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Nichols.

**CIRCUMSTANCES PRELUDE TO TESTIMONY**

On May 28, 1975, Nichols telephonically advised the FBI that SSC Staff Member Lester B. Seidel had requested, and Nichols agreed, to travel to Washington, D. C., from Atlanta, Georgia, to be interviewed in the Committee's offices. Seidel indicated the interview would concern Martin Luther King, Jr., Stanley David Levison, and related matters. Nichols was unable to advise whether it would be a staff interview or an appearance for testimony purposes before an Executive Session of the Committee. He was not told by Seidel that his appearance would be pursuant to a subpoena. Nichols requested that the FBI make available a representative so that Nichols might consult with him during the interview, if necessary. Nichols was informed that the presence of a Bureau representative should not be interpreted as the FBI furnishing counsel but that the representative would merely assist Nichols in determining whether a specific question should be answered or whether a response could properly be declined because it falls within one or more privileged areas. He was told these areas covered information

- 1 - 67-414885 (Personnel File Robert R. Nichols)
- 1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
- 1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

Original and one copy to Attorney General

SFP:mjg

(14) CLASS. & EXT. BY SP-16SK/BA 10/31/80

SEE NOTE PAGE TWELVE

REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2

DATE OF REVIEW 6-1-93

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ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4/92 BY SP-16SK/BA

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES  
AND FIELD OFFICES  
ADVISED BY ROUTING  
SLIP(S) OF CLAS  
DATE 10-18-01

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

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**U. S. Senate Select Committee to  
Study Governmental Operations With  
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)**

**Re: Testimony of Retired FBI  
Special Agent (SA) Robert R.  
Nichols Before SSC Executive Session**

which might compromise a source; information which might divulge a sensitive investigative technique or method; information which might divulge what had been furnished the FBI by other Government agencies and/or foreign intelligence sources; and information which might adversely affect an ongoing investigation. It was pointed out to Nichols that if he so desired, he could obtain private counsel. He was invited to obtain additional personal briefing on the early morning of May 30, 1975, before his appearance before the SSC, from the Legal Counsel Division and the Intelligence Division of the FBI. *R*

Early on the morning of May 30, 1975, Nichols was briefed by the FBI, including advice to him that his employment agreement with the FBI was being waived for the purposes of the interview by the SSC to the extent that it pertained to King, Levison and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the organization which had been headed up by King. Nichols was reminded of the areas of privilege and, at his request, was accompanied to the SSC offices by SA Seymour F. Phillips of the FBI.

At the SSC offices, Nichols and Phillips met Mr. John Bayly of the office of the Minority Counsel of the Committee who indicated that the interview would be under oath. Staff Member Seidel then appeared and inquiry was made of him by Phillips as to whether the interview would be under oath, it being noted that it was only then, after appearing at the SSC offices, that Nichols and Phillips became aware of the oath aspects of the interview. When Seidel said that Nichols would be interviewed in an Executive Session, Phillips asked that he be permitted to confer with FBI Headquarters as it would require clearance from the

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**U. S. Senate Select Committee to  
Study Governmental Operations With  
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)**

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**Re: Testimony of Retired FBI  
Special Agent (SA) Robert R.  
Nichols Before SSC Executive Session**

Attorney General (AG) before Nichols would be able to testify. Such AG clearance was immediately obtained telephonically through FBI Headquarters and Phillips advised Nichols, Seidel and Mr. John Smith, of the office of Senator Walter D. Huddleston of the Committee that clearance for the interview had been obtained from the AG provided the interview was within the scope of the aforementioned areas. Phillips further indicated that if Nichols believed the interview was outside the scope, he could invoke 16.22, Code of Federal Regulations. Arrangements were made for the Executive Session to take place in the nearby old Carroll Arms Hotel while Phillips remained at the SSC offices in the event he was needed for consultation purposes. &

The Executive Session took place in Room 607 of the old Carroll Arms Hotel and lasted approximately for the period from 10:40 a.m., to 1:15 p.m. Present in addition to Seidel, Bayly and Smith, were a male reporter and Senator Huddleston who administered the oath to Nichols, remained about twenty minutes and who asked only a few questions. At the outset of this session, Seidel furnished Nichols the Rules of Procedure of the SSC, including Senate Resolution 21. Nichols was permitted to look at the Rules of Procedure and after a brief review, he told Seidel he was satisfied as to the SSC authority and that they could proceed with the questioning. Nichols was advised of his rights, including that to counsel. &

**TESTIMONY OF ROBERT R. NICHOLS**

The following reports the questions and answers as furnished by Nichols, but not necessarily in chronological order.

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**U. S. Senate Select Committee to  
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**Re: Testimony of Retired FBI  
Special Agent (SA) Robert R.  
Nichols Before SSC Executive Session**

Nichols was questioned about the communist background of Levison. He replied that he could not discuss this matter because it would jeopardize an FBI source. Nichols indicated that he did not know the identity of the source. Seidel, who did most of the questioning throughout the session, then asked Nichols a series of questions attempting to determine whether the source was a technical one, a foreign one, a "Soviet" one, also naming several other types. Nichols' answer in each case was that he did not know. At one point, Seidel claimed that Nichols had said it was a foreign source. Nichols then stated he did not recall having so stated and that if he had so stated, it was wrong as he did not know the source. Seidel then asked how Nichols knew that the information he had would disclose the source if he was unaware of the source's identity. Nichols responded that inasmuch as he knew in advance the interview would include the subject of Levison, he had asked Phillips of the FBI what he could discuss about Levison. Nichols then related that Phillips had asked Nichols what he knew or recalled about Levison's background and that when he gave Phillips certain information, Phillips told him that that information would possibly identify the source and, therefore, would be privileged. (The Nichols-Phillips exchange referred to here took place during the early morning of that same day, May 30, 1975).

R.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

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**U. S. Senate Select Committee to  
Study Governmental Operations With  
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)**

**Re: Testimony of Retired FBI  
Special Agent (SA) Robert R.  
Nichols Before SSC Executive Session**

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Seidel questioned Nichols concerning alleged harassment of King by the FBI and mentioned such specific allegations as the following: Sending of a tape recording to Mrs. King; anonymous telephone calls to attempt to cancel press meetings by King; false fire alarms; and furnishing of information about King to the clergy and other news media, including an Atlanta editor, Ralph McGill. In each instance during this phase of the questioning, which Nichols described as rather extensive by Seidel, Nichols answered that he did not participate in any such actions and was unaware that any such things were being done. He also told Seidel that he knew of no COINTELPRO (counterintelligence) activity on the part of the FBI against King.

Nichols was asked if he had contact at Atlanta, Georgia, Police Department (PD) in the King investigation which Nichols acknowledged he had been assigned to in 1964. Nichols answered that he had confided in one detective in the security detail of the PD and on the urging of Seidel, Nichols furnished the detective's identity as Sergeant Bobby Moore.

- 5 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**U. S. Senate Select Committee to  
Study Governmental Operations With  
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**Re: Testimony of Retired FBI  
Special Agent (SA) Robert R.  
Nichols Before SSC Executive Session**

Nichols was questioned as to what type of investigation concerning King was conducted besides the use of a technical surveillance. Nichols replied that he had attempted to initiate action to infiltrate the SCLC with live informants but that every one of his suggestions along this line was turned down by FBI Headquarters. Nichols furnished the reason for these rejections as being that the FBI did not want to interfere with civil rights organizations but indicated that the Bureau had never told him this in the rejections and that it was his own rationale. Nichols indicated that from time to time spot physical surveillances would take place in Atlanta to verify contacts between King and individuals known or suspected of being communists. During this phase of the interview, Seidel mentioned the name of Harry Wachtel and Nichols acknowledged he was one of King's contacts. In response to a question as to whether or not trash or mail covers were used against King, Nichols responded that they were not.

Inquiry was made as to why so much reliance was placed by the FBI on technical coverage of King and so little was done in the way of physical surveillances. Seidel pointed out that a technical surveillance of an individual was a greater infringement of his privacy than was a physical surveillance. Nichols responded that the Bureau did what it felt was necessary to get the information it needed. Seidel then asked Nichols how he would personally feel about a technical surveillance on him, Nichols. Nichols' response was that he would rather have his phone tapped than to always be followed around.

Nichols was questioned concerning the authority for the technical surveillance of King and how Nichols would learn of such authority. Nichols explained that he would be

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**U. S. Senate Select Committee to  
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**Re: Testimony of Retired FBI  
Special Agent (SA) Robert R.  
Nichols Before SSC Executive Session**

called into the office of the Special Agent in Charge and told that advice from the Bureau had been received that the technical surveillance was authorized. When inquiry was made concerning the mechanics of installing the surveillance, Nichols answered that he had nothing to do with this phase. On questioning, Nichols discussed the monitoring plant he had set up with a cover company and Nichols gave the general location of the plant. Nichols indicated that he did not know who actually made the installation and was asked if an Al Miller was the sound man in the office. Nichols acknowledged that he was and when asked if Nichols had monitored the surveillance, Nichols indicated he had on a spot basis.

Nichols was questioned and furnished information of a biographical and personal nature. It included such things as the period of time he was assigned in Atlanta, the period of time assigned security work, the King case and criminal work, as well as when and why he had been transferred from Atlanta to Oklahoma City. Seidel brought up the matter of Nichols' testimony in Houston, Texas, in connection with an FBI case concerning the heavyweight boxer Cassius Clay. On questioning, Nichols acknowledged he had been transferred to Oklahoma City because of what the Bureau considered his deficiencies in his testimony in that case. Seidel inquired as to what actually Nichols had done wrong and Nichols replied that he had received a letter of censure but had thrown it away and cannot now recall the specific deficiencies for which he was censured. He only recalled that his testimony was considered not up to Bureau standards. Seidel then asked, "What are the Bureau standards? Didn't you tell the truth?" Nichols responded that there was no question as to the truthfulness of his testimony, that he had told the truth.

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**U. S. Senate Select Committee to  
Study Governmental Operations With  
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)**

**Re: Testimony of Retired FBI  
Special Agent (SA) Robert R.  
Nichols Before SSC Executive Session**

Nichols was questioned about his contacts with another retired FBI Agent, Alan Sentinella, to whom the King case was assigned after it had been handled by Nichols. Nichols was asked if he had discussed his forthcoming testimony with Sentinella who resides in Atlanta. Nichols acknowledged that he had had a discussion with Sentinella but that they had both purposely avoided any discussion of the substance of Nichols' testimony-to-be and the testimony which Sentinella had already given the SSC. They discussed only procedural aspects as Nichols wanted to have some idea in advance as to what might be expected in any trip to Washington to testify. It was Nichols' impression that Seidel thought that Nichols was holding out some information on this matter.

On at least three occasions Seidel inquired of Nichols as to whether he had discussed his forthcoming testimony with Charles Harding of Atlanta, a retired FBI Agent who had also been acquainted with the King case in 1964. On each occasion, Nichols denied that he had had any discussion with Harding on this matter.

Nichols was questioned as to whether the technical surveillance on King was justified and his response was that it was justified. When asked why, Nichols stated that there was considerable evidence of communist influences on King inasmuch as King was receiving much advice in his work from Levison and other communists. Seidel asked if they included Jack O'Dell and Harry Wachtel and Nichols acknowledged that it did. When Nichols was asked as to whether or not he had developed any information as to the communist background of Levison, O'Dell or Wachtel, Nichols responded that he had not and that the information was developed by others.

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**U. S. Senate Select Committee to  
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**Re: Testimony of Retired FBI  
Special Agent (SA) Robert R.  
Nichols Before SSC Executive Session**

At one point, when Seidel asked about alleged harassment by the FBI, Nichols told him of FBI investigations of church burnings in South Georgia and that the Bureau recognized outstanding work by its Agents in this field and that some of the Agents, including Nichols, had received meritorious awards. Nichols indicated that he had been commended for his work generally in civil rights investigations.

When asked about what the FBI was doing in the King case besides use of wiretaps, Nichols advised that he had attended a conference at FBI Headquarters to explore avenues of investigation that might be pursued in the King case. The objective was to discuss ways of better determining the extent of the communist influences on King. Nichols furnished the names of the following FBI personnel as attending the conference: Agents Henry Rouse and Nichols from Atlanta; and from FBI Headquarters, Assistant Director William C. Sullivan, and Agents Larry Gurley and Fred Baumgardner. (Nichols advised that also attending the conference was a Bureau official, Joseph Sizoo, but that he did not furnish this name during his testimony as he did not then recall his presence at the conference). Nichols told the SSC that he could not remember what decisions were made at the conference.

Nichols was questioned concerning a dispute between King and former FBI Director Hoover which had been aired by the news media. Nichols was asked if the dispute was the reason for technical coverage of King and Nichols answered that he was convinced that that was not the reason for the technical coverage; that such coverage was otherwise fully justified. Nichols pointed out that the investigation of King was initiated before the dispute although it was his recollection that the technical coverage started after the dispute.

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**U. S. Senate Select Committee to  
Study Governmental Operations With  
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)**

**Re: Testimony of Retired FBI  
Special Agent (SA) Robert R.  
Nichols Before SSC Executive Session**

Attempt was made by Seidel to question Nichols concerning FBI investigation of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee but Nichols refused to discuss the matter on the basis it was outside the parameters of the testimony.

Nichols was questioned concerning an alleged visit of William C. Sullivan to Atlanta to see the newspaper editor, Ralph McGill. This discussion was initiated in the context of the allegation that the FBI furnished information about King to the news media. Nichols responded that he did not remember Sullivan ever coming to Atlanta.

Nichols was asked if he knew about the writing of a monograph about King by an FBI Agent named Charles Brennan. Nichols responded that he did not know of this.

Nichols advised that he was offered the opportunity to make a statement at the beginning of his testimony but declined to do so. He was given the same offer at the close of his testimony and he made a statement to the following effect. Nichols believed that the Bureau had always conducted the King investigation with the objective of determining the extent of communist influences on King and on the SCLC and that the only way to make a determination as to the full extent required technical coverage. Nichols pointed out that the Bureau never interfered in the legitimate civil rights activities of individuals or organizations or harassed such people and that it was Nichols' belief that FBI personnel were doing what they were being paid for when they conducted legitimate investigations revolving around communism and communist influences in civil rights activities.

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**U. S. Senate Select Committee to  
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**Re: Testimony of Retired FBI  
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Nichols Before SSC Executive Session**

Also at the conclusion of the testimony, Nichols was told that a draft of the testimony would be made available for him to review for editing purposes. The SSC would telephone Nichols who was returning to Atlanta to advise him the draft would be available and Nichols would have five days to review same. Nichols was told that the draft could not be mailed to him but that someone might bring it to Atlanta; otherwise, Nichols would have to return to Washington, D. C., if he wanted to review it. Expenses for such a second trip were not mentioned.

On June 2, 1975, Nichols telephoned FBI Headquarters from Birmingham, Alabama, where he was temporarily residing and advised he recalled the following additional details of what was covered in his testimony.

Seidel asked Nichols if information received through technical coverage included information relating to

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Senator Huddleston asked Nichols how it would be possible to follow the Bureau instruction precisely and Nichols responded that it would be very difficult to comply and in some instances, it would not be possible. Seidel then commented, "Why - because of the nature of the beast?" (wiretap).

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**U. S. Senate Select Committee to  
Study Governmental Operations With  
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**Re: Testimony of Retired FBI  
Special Agent (SA) Robert R.  
Nichols Before SSC Executive Session**

John Smith of Senator Huddleston's office asked the difference between a bug and a wiretap and Nichols responded that a bug was a microphone implanted on the premises whereas a wiretap was an interception of a telephone line. Smith then asked if there was a bug on King or the SCLC in Atlanta and Nichols responded "not to my knowledge." Seidel asked about any other places in Atlanta where there may have been bugs on King and Nichols advised he had no knowledge of any. Seidel asked if Nichols was familiar with a Willard Hotel (Washington, D. C.) incident involving King and Nichols responded that he was not.

**NOTE:**

Original and one copy to the Attorney General copy for forwarding to the White House. Debriefing of Nichols, including telephonic contact from him 6/2/75, by S. F. Phillips.

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